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Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits
Using the Regression Kink Design
By Camille Landais∗
I show how, in the tradition of the dynamic labor supply litera-
ture, one can identify the moral hazard effects and liquidity effects
of unemployment insurance (UI) using variations along the time
profile of unemployment benefits. I use this strategy to investigate
the anatomy of labor supply responses to UI. I identify the effect
of benefit level and potential duration in the regression kink design
using kinks in the schedule of benefits in the US. My results sug-
gest that the response of search effort to UI benefits is driven as
much by liquidity effects as by moral hazard effects. Keywords:
Unemployment insurance, Regression Kink Design
Most social insurance and transfer programs have time-varying benefits, in the
sense that the benefits received are a function of time spent in the program.
Changing the generosity of these programs therefore involves affecting the time
profile of benefits. It is now well-understood, in particular in the context of
unemployment insurance (UI), that labor supply responses to such variations in
the time profile of benefits consist of a combination of liquidity effects and “moral
hazard” effects. And that the dichotomy between the moral hazard effect and the
liquidity effect of benefits is critical to assess the welfare impact of such social
insurance and transfer programs (Shimer and Werning [2008], Chetty [2008]).
But, to date, the dichotomy has been of little practical interest because of the
difficulty to disentangle these two effects empirically1.
The contribution of this paper is to propose a new strategy to estimate liq-
uidity and moral hazard effects in the context of unemployment insurance. I
show how the dichotomy between liquidity effects and moral hazard effects can
be reinterpreted in light of the more traditional literature on dynamic labor sup-
ply, and how the moral hazard effect of UI on search effort can be related to
the Frisch elasticity concept (i.e. the response of search effort to a change in
benefits keeping marginal utility of wealth constant). Following the methodology
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variations in the timing of EITC refunds, there has been very few attempts to empirically estimate the
magnitude of liquidity effects of social insurance programs.
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of MaCurdy [1981], which relies on exploiting (exogenous) variations in the wage
profile, keeping marginal utility of wealth constant, I propose a similar method
to identify the moral hazard effects of UI using variations along the time profile
of benefits brought about by exogenous variations in the benefit level as well as
the benefit duration. Importantly, this strategy only relies on exploiting individ-
uals’ first order conditions and variations in the time profile of benefits. It is, in
this sense, very general, and can be applied to any other transfer program with
time-dependent benefits.
I implement empirically this identification strategy, identifying the effect of both
benefit level and potential duration in the regression kink (RK) design, using kinks
in the schedule of UI benefits, following Card et al. [2012]. I use administrative
data from the Continuous Wage and Benefit History Project (CWBH) on the
universe of unemployment spells in five states in the US from the late 1970s
to 19842. Since identification in the regression kink design relies on estimating
changes in the slope of the relationship between an assignment variable and some
outcomes of interest, the granularity of the CWBH data is a key advantage and
smaller samples of UI recipients would in general not exhibit enough statistical
power to detect any effect in a RK design. I provide compelling graphical evidence
and find significant responses of unemployment and non-employment duration
with respect to both benefit level and potential duration for all states and periods
in the CWBH data. I provide various tests for the robustness of the RK design,
and assess its validity to overcome the traditional issue of endogeneity in UI
benefit variations on US data. These tests include graphical and regression based
tests of the identifying assumptions as well as placebo tests and kink-detection
and kink-location tests. I also use variations in the location of the kink over time
to implement a difference-in-difference RK strategy to check the robustness of the
results.
Overall, replicating the RK design for all states and periods, my results suggest
that a 10% increase in the benefit level increases the duration of UI claims by
about 4% on average, and that increasing the potential duration of benefit by a
week increases the duration of UI claims by about .3 to .4 week on average. These
estimates are higher than estimates found in European countries using sharp RD
designs but are still lower than previous estimates on US data. My results also
suggest that the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard effects in the response of labor
supply to a variation in unemployment benefits is around .9. This confirms the
existence of significant liquidity effects as found in Chetty [2008]. But interest-
ingly, the identification strategy for moral hazard and liquidity effects proposed in
this paper only uses administrative UI data and the RK design, and can therefore
deliver timely estimates of liquidity effects without the need for data on consump-
tion or on assets. I finally use these estimates to calibrate the welfare benefits of
UI.
2Records begin in January 1976 for Idaho, in January 1979 for Louisiana, January 1978 for Missouri,
April 1980 for New Mexico and July 1979 for Washington
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section I, I present a
simple dynamic model to show how the moral hazard effect can be identified
using variations in the time profile of UI benefits, that, in practice, come from
variations in both benefit level and potential duration. In section II, I present
the RKD strategy, the data and provide with institutional background on the
functioning of UI rules. In section III, I present the results of the labor supply
effects of benefit level and potential duration, and I present various tests for the
robustness of the RKD estimates. Finally, in section IV, I estimate the liquidity
to moral hazard ratio of the effect of UI, and calibrate the welfare benefits of UI
using my RKD estimates.
I. Relating moral hazard to estimable behavioral responses
I show in this section how the dichotomy between liquidity effects and moral
hazard effects can be reinterpreted in light of the more traditional literature on
dynamic labor supply and how one can use the insights from this literature to
back out moral hazard effects from comparing the behavioral response of current
search effort to variations in benefits at different points in time.
In a standard dynamic labor supply model, with time-separability, a change
in the net return to work today has two effects on current labor supply. First,
there is an effect due to the manipulation of the current return to work keeping
marginal utility of wealth constant: this effect relates to the concept of Frisch
elasticity. Second, there is a wealth effect due to the change in the marginal
utility of wealth3. The “Macurdy critique” (MaCurdy [1981]) formulated against
static reduced-form labor supply studies using tax reform variation builds on this
simple argument. A permanent tax change dt will shift the whole net-of-tax wage
profile as shown on the left hand side of figure 1 panel A, and the effect of such
a tax change on labour supply should therefore be interpreted as a mix of wealth
effect and “Frisch” effects.
Another important point of the standard dynamic labor supply literature is
that any variation in the future returns to work only affects current labor supply
through the marginal utility of wealth. An obvious corollary is that you can
back out the wealth effects and the Frisch elasticity component by comparing the
effect on current labor supply of a marginal change in the return to effort today
versus that of an equivalent marginal change in return to effort in the future.
This is the principle of the methodology used in MaCurdy [1981], which relies on
exploiting (exogenous) variations in the wage profile, keeping marginal utility of
wealth constant as shown on the right hand side of figure 1 panel A.
In the context of unemployment benefits, most countries have two-tiers UI ben-
efits systems, giving benefits b for a maximum period of B weeks, at which point
3See online appendix C.1 for a simple exposition of a standard dynamic labor supply model without
state dependence, and how Frisch elasticities can be identified using variations in the wage profiles.
4 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL AUGUST 2014
UI benefit exhaust, and UI benefits are zero afterwards. A change in the benefit
level db received by the unemployed for the first B periods can be interpreted
as a full shift of the profile of the returns to search effort, as in the left hand
side of figure 1 panel B. Most studies exploiting variations in the benefit level b
across individuals to analyze the effect of UI benefits on search effort therefore es-
timate a mix of wealth effects and of distortionary “Frisch” effects (moral hazard
effects). This is the point explicitly made by Chetty [2008]. The idea developed
here is that one can use, as has been traditionally done in the dynamic labor
supply literature, variations in the net return to search effort at different points
in time in order to disentangle wealth effects from the moral hazard effects4 .
Such variation is brought about by variations in benefit level and in the potential
duration of benefits as shown in the right hand side of figure 1 panel B. The
only notable difference in the context of unemployment benefits is the presence
of state-dependence: search effort today affects in which state one ends up to-
morrow. In other words, when increasing future benefits (through an increase in
the potential duration B for instance), one only gets the higher benefits if still
unemployed after B periods. Because of this, variations in future benefits do not
only have an effect on current job search effort through the marginal utility of
wealth, but also through the net return to search effort today.
To make the point across and explain the intuition of the main results, I only
present a simplified two-period version of a partial equilibrium dynamic search
model, a class of models that has been used extensively to analyze the welfare
implications of UI benefits (Chetty [2008], Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender
[2012]). Proofs and discussion for the multi-period model are in online appendix
C. The model describes the behavior of a worker who is laid-off and therefore
becomes unemployed before the start of period zero. If the worker is unemployed
at the start of period i, he exerts (endogenous) search effort si, which has a utility
cost ψ(si), with ψ
′ ≥ 0 and ψ′′ ≥ 0. Search effort si translates into a probability to
find a job5 that I normalize to si to simplify presentation
6. If employed in period
0, the worker gets utility u(ce0) = u(A0 − A1 + w0 − τ), where A0 is the initial
level of wealth and u′ ≥ 0 ;u′′ ≤ 0. w0 is the wage rate (assumed exogenous)
and τ is the payroll tax paid to finance UI benefits. If employed in period 1, the
worker gets utility u(ce1) = u(A1 − A¯+ w1 − τ) where A¯ is asset level at the end
of period 1, subject to the non-Ponzi condition A¯ ≥ 0. We can also introduce
liquidity constraints of the form A1 ≥ L, A¯ ≥ L. If unemployed in period 0, the
worker gets utility u(cu0) = u(A0 −A1 + b0), where b0 are UI benefits in period 0.
And if unemployed in period 1, the worker gets utility: u(cu1) = u(A1 − A¯ + b1).
4Note also that if agents are totally credit constrained, or totally myopic, the dynamic dimension of
the problem is irrelevant, and the effect of UI benefits is a mix of contemporaneous income effects and
substitution effects, as in the static case. Identification of distortionary effects of UI would then simply
require the use of contemporaneous income shocks to control for income effects.
5This captures the presence of search frictions in the labor market.
6We also assume that search effort is not observable from the social planner, and this is why we
describe as “moral hazard” the distortions in search effort induced by UI benefits.
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Lifetime utility at the start of period 0 is given by:
U = s0u(ce0)+(1−s0)u(cu0)−ψ(s0)+β
(
s0u(c
e
1)+(1−s0)
(
s1u(c
e
1)+(1−s1)u(cu1)−ψ(s1)
))
where β is the discount factor, and we assume interest rates to be zero for
simplicity. Maximizing utility with respect to search effort in period 0, s0, yields
the following first-order condition:
(1)
ψ′(s0) = u(ce0) + βu(ce1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lifetime utility if employed in period 0
−
(
u(cu0 ) + β
(
s1u(c
e
1) + (1− s1)u(cu1 )− ψ(s1)
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lifetime utility if unemployed in period 0
This is the standard optimal intratemporal allocation rule where the marginal
disutility of effort in period 0 equals the marginal return to effort in period 0, i.e.
the lifetime utility of getting employment starting in period 0 minus the lifetime
utility of staying unemployed in period 07. From this intratemporal allocation
rule we get that:
(2)
∂s0
∂b0
= − u
′(cu0)
ψ′′(s0)
=
∂s0
∂A0
− ∂s0
∂w0
This decomposition, at the centre of the argument in Chetty [2008] can be thought
of as a standard dynamic decomposition of the effect of current returns to effort
between a Frisch elasticity concept keeping marginal utility of wealth constant
( ∂s0∂w0 ), that from now on will be referred to as the moral hazard effect of UI
benefits, and a wealth effect ∂s0∂A0
8.
Individuals choose their consumption level every period once the result of the
search process is realised. From their optimal choice we get the standard Euler
conditions determining the optimal inter temporal allocation of consumption:
u′(ce0) = βu
′(ce1)(3)
u′(cu0) = β
(
s1u
′(ce1) + (1− s1)u′(cu1)
)
(4)
Using (1), (3) and (4), we can retrieve the simple relationship between the effect
of current and future wages on current effort:
7In the absence of state-dependence (or in a static model), only u(ce0) and u(c
u
0 ) would appear in this
first-order condition, and future wages would only affect current effort through the marginal utility of
wealth (wealth effect). See online appendix C for a simple example of a two-period labor supply model
without state-dependence.
8I explain more in depth in online appendix C.1 the comparison between this decomposition and the
one obtained in a standard model without state dependence.
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(5)
∂s0
∂w1
= (1− s1) · ∂s0
∂w0
The intuition for this relationship, which stems directly from the presence of
state dependence, is simply that increasing wages tomorrow induces me to search
more today to benefit from the extra consumption tomorrow if I am employed at
the start of the period, but at the same time, I can delay search until tomorrow
and find a job tomorrow with probability s1 to benefit from the extra wages
tomorrow. The effect of increasing the net reward from work tomorrow on search
effort today is therefore s1% smaller than the effect of increasing wages today
on search effort today9. And if s1 = 1, then I will be employed with certainty
in period 1, irrespective of my search effort in period 0, therefore changes in the
wage rate in period 1 will have no effect on my search effort in period 0 in this
case.
Using 5, and Euler conditions 3 and 4, a change in b1 can therefore be decom-
posed as:
(6)
∂s0
∂b1
= −β (1− s1)u
′(cu1)
ψ′′(s0)
=
∂s0
∂A0
− (1− s1) ∂s0
∂w0
And therefore we have that:
(7)
∂s0
∂b0
− ∂s0
∂b1
= −s1 · ∂s0
∂w0
In a model with no state dependence, the effect of future benefits would give us
the wealth effect directly but here, because of state dependence, the effect of future
benefits on current search effort is larger in absolute value than the pure wealth
effect, as shown in equation (6), since the change in future benefits also affects the
net return to effort in the current period. Then the difference between the effect
of current and future returns, which would give us the Frisch elasticity directly
9The best way to understand this result is to rewrite lifetime budget constraint:
A0 + s0(w0 − τ) + (1− s0)b0 + s0(w1 − τ) + (1− s1)s0(w1 − τ) + (1− s0)(1− s1)b1 ≥ C0 + C1
A0 + b0 + b1 + s0 [∆c0 + (1− s1)∆c1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price of effort at time 0
+ s1 [∆c1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price of effort at time 1
≥ C0 + C1
where ∆c0 = (w0 − τ − b0) and ∆c1 = (w1 − τ − b1). In other words, by exerting effort at time 0,
your reward is the extra money ∆c0 you gain in period 0 compared to remaining unemployed plus the
extra money you earn tomorrow (1 − s1)∆c1 because you will enter period 1 as employed. The reason
your return for tomorrow is (1− s1)∆c1 and not simply ∆c1 is because you could also have had ∆c1 by
exerting effort tomorrow instead and therefore get ∆c1 with probability s1. In other words, altering the
total price of effort at time 0 by dw0 or by (1− s1)dw1 is equivalent, and should have the same effect on
effort at time 0. Hence the result that ∂s0
∂w1
= (1− s1) · ∂s0∂w0 .
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as in MaCurdy [1981] in the absence of state dependence, here gives us s1 times
the moral hazard, because the effect of benefits tomorrow also contains a moral
hazard dimension; but we know that this moral hazard component is s1% smaller
than the moral hazard component of today’s benefits. In other words, variations
in search effort brought about by changes in the profile of benefits contains a lot
of information, but one needs to take explicitly the state-dependence dimension
of the dynamic problem to retrieve parameters that are meaningful for welfare
analysis.
The strategy used in this paper to identify the moral hazard effects of UI relies
on the use of variations along the time profile of benefits brought about by ex-
ogenous variations on both benefit levels and potential benefit duration in the UI
system. Proposition 1 generalizes the insight of (7) to a multi period case where
variations in b0 and b1 from the two period model are now replaced by variations
in benefit level b and potential duration B. As in the two-period model, a change
in benefits today due to an increase in the benefit level b affects search effort to-
day through a liquidity and a moral hazard effect. A change in benefits tomorrow
because of a benefit extension also affects search effort today through a liquidity
effect and through a moral hazard effect because of state dependence. As shown
in figure 1 panel B, a benefit level increase or a benefit extension will give the
same dollar increment in liquidity to unemployed individuals when B∂b = b∂B.
This explains why, compared to (7), ∂s0∂b0 now becomes
1
B
∂s0
∂b in proposition 1, and
∂s0
∂b1
becomes 1b
∂s0
∂B . Proposition 1 simply uses the fact that the liquidity effects of
the same dollar increment in a benefit level increase and in a benefit extension are
equal, so that the difference in the effects on search effort at time 0 of a benefit
level increase and of a benefit extension can identify the moral hazard effect.
PROPOSITION 1. If the borrowing constraint does not bind after B periods,
the moral hazard effect Θ1 of providing UI benefits b for B periods is a linear
combination of the effects on exit rate at the start of a spell of an increase in
benefit duration (∂s0∂B ) and of an increase in benefit level (
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣
B
)
(8)
1
B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
− 1
b
∂s0
∂B
= −S
B
1 − S1(B)
DB1
· Θ1
where S1(B) is the survival rate at time B conditional on being unemployed at
period 1, SB1 is the average survival rate between time 1 and time B conditional
on being unemployed at period 1, and DB1 is the average duration of covered UI
spells conditional on being unemployed at time 1.
Proof: see online appendix C.
To understand the intuition behind proposition 1 it is useful to compare it to
the standard dynamic labor supply. In this case, there is no state-dependence,
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and giving one extra dollar of wealth today or tomorrow through an increase
in the wage rate has the same wealth effect on labor supply today, so that the
difference in the behavioral response of search effort today to a change in the wage
rate today and tomorrow washes out the wealth effect, and only the moral hazard
or Frisch effect remains. In the presence of state-dependence, search effort today
affects in which state one will be tomorrow. In other words, when increasing
potential duration dB, one only gets the higher benefits if still unemployed after
B periods. In this case, the difference in the effect of current and future benefits
on search effort today only identifies the moral hazard effect up to a term that
depends on the ex-ante survival function, as shown in proposition 1.
Heterogeneity:
An interesting aspect of proposition 1 is that it can be generalized to allow for the
presence of heterogeneity. The reason for this generalizability is that proposition
1 is only making use of individual optimality conditions. Suppose the economy
has N individuals, indexed by i and for simplicity, let us focus back on the two-
period case. Denote E[∂s0∂b0 ] =
1
N
∑N
i=1
∂si0
∂b0
the mean response of search effort in
period 0 to a change in benefit at time 0 and E[∂s0∂b1 ] =
1
N
∑N
i=1
∂si0
∂b1
the mean
response of search effort in period 0 to a change in benefit at time 1. Then
E[∂s0∂b0 ] − E[∂s0∂b1 ] = E[∂s0∂b0 − ∂s0∂b1 ] = E[s1 ∂s0∂w0 ] where we only use individual first
order conditions regarding consumption and search effort. If heterogeneity is
such that the distribution of optimal effort si and
∂si0
∂w0
are independent, then we
have E[∂s0∂b0 ]−E[∂s0∂b1 ] = s¯1 ·E[ ∂s0∂w0 ], where s¯1 =
∑N
i=1
si1
N is the average hazard rate in
period 1. Note however that the independence of the optimal effort level and the
marginal effect of w0 on optimal effort can actually be a fairly strong assumption
depending on the type of heterogeneity one considers. If heterogeneity was in
parameters related to risk preferences, for example, this would most certainly
not be true and a covariance term would kick in that would also need to be
estimated10.
Empirically, this means that the difference between the average behavioral re-
sponse of search effort of the unemployed in period 0 to a change in benefits in
period 0 versus a change in benefits in period 1 can be related to the average moral
hazard effect of UI benefits in period 0 E[ ∂s0∂w0 ], and by extension, to the average
liquidity effect of UI benefits E[ ∂s0∂A0 ]. And as shown in Chetty [2008], the ratio of
the average moral hazard effect to the average liquidity effect is a sufficient statis-
tic for the optimal level of UI benefit in the presence of heterogeneity. In other
words, even in the presence of heterogeneity, the difference between the average
behavioral responses of search effort to variations in UI benefits at different point
in time reveals all the relevant information for the Baily formula.
Stochastic wage offers:
10Note that Andrews and Miller [2014] have a similar discussion on heterogeneity and sufficient statis-
tics in the context of UI.
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The result of proposition 1 can also be extended to the presence of stochastic
wage offers, whereby an agent’s hazard rate out of unemployment would depend
both on her search effort and her reservation wage. Suppose that in period t
with probability st (controlled by search intensity) the agent is offered a wage
w ∼ wˆ+F (w) and assume i.i.d. wage draws across periods. In such a framework
(McCall [1970]), the agent follows a reservation-wage policy: in each period, there
is a cutoff Rt such that the agent accepts a job only if the wage w > Rt. I show
in online appendix C.6 that the result of proposition 1 remains unchanged in this
context, because the agent is setting her reservation wage profile optimally, so
that the envelope theorem applies and there is no first-order effect of a change in
reservation-wage policy on the agent’s expected utility. In the two-period case,
formula (7) becomes
(9)
∂s0
∂b0
− ∂s0
∂b1
= −h1 ∂s0
∂w0
where h1 = s1P [w ≥ R1] is the hazard rate out of unemployment11 in period 1,
and P [w ≥ R1] is the probability that the wage offered in period 1 is larger than
the reservation wage in period 1 R1.
Relationship with optimal UI formula:
The importance of isolating moral hazard from liquidity effects lies in the fact
that they reveal critical information about the consumption smoothing benefits
of UI, and as a consequence about the welfare effects of UI. The ratio of moral
hazard to liquidity effects is actually directly proportional to the risk aversion
parameter (c· u′′u′ ) and therefore to the consumption smoothing benefits of UI. The
intuition for this is the following. First, the moral hazard effect of UI (ds/dw)
is proportional to u′: the larger the marginal benefit of a dollar, the more the
agent’s search effort will react to a one dollar increase in her wage rate. Second,
the liquidity effects (ds/dA) is proportional to u′′: when u′′ is large, if wealth
falls, u′ rises sharply, and individuals will exert a lot of effort to find a job.
Therefore, the consumption smoothing benefits of UI, which constitute the left-
hand side of the traditional Baily formula can be recast in terms of the ratio of
moral hazard to liquidity effects. Chetty [2008] shows how to obtain this modified
Baily formula to calibrate the optimal benefit level for a constant duration, and I
show in online appendix C that a similar formula can be obtained to calibrate the
optimal duration of benefit for a given benefit level. Armed with these modified
formulas for the optimal benefit level and optimal benefit duration, and using
proposition 1, it becomes possible to evaluate the welfare impact of local policy
reforms using only responses of search effort to variations in the time profile of
unemployment benefits, and without estimation of the full underlying structural
11The only difficulty lies in defining the empirical counterparts for the implementation of formula
9, as changes in empirically observed job finding hazards cannot be directly used to infer the relevant
changes in search intensity because part of the change in job finding hazards comes from changes in the
reservation wage. I give two options for empirical implementation in online appendix C.6.
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model.
To fully implement the proposed strategy, and calibrate optimal formula for UI
level (resp. benefit duration) I need to estimate three statistics: the elasticity
of the duration of paid unemployment spell with respect to benefit level (resp.
benefit duration), the elasticity of the duration of total non-employment spell
with respect to benefit level (resp. benefit duration), and the ratio of liquidity
effect to moral hazard effect of an increase in benefit level (resp. benefit duration).
In the empirical implementation, I begin by estimating the two elasticities. To
estimate the ratio of moral hazard to liquidity effects, I estimate the effect of a
change in benefit level on the hazard rate at the start of the spell ∂s0∂b
∣∣∣
B
and the
effect of a change in potential duration on the hazard rate at the start of the spell
∂s0
∂B
∣∣∣
b
. I then use proposition 1 to get the moral hazard effect Θ1 of providing
UI benefits b for B periods. Finally, I use the fact that the behavioral response
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣
B
is the sum of the liquidity effect ( ∂s0∂a
∣∣∣
B
) and of the moral hazard effect Θ1
(see online appendix C for details) to back out the liquidity effect and compute
the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard effects.
Pros and cons of the proposed method:
The obvious advantage of the proposed method to estimate moral hazard and
liquidity effects is that it can be done from estimation of search responses only.
Proposition 1 relates the structural approach of dynamic models to behavioral
responses of search effort that can be estimated in reduced-form using credibly
exogenous variations in both benefit levels and potential durations for the same in-
dividuals. And as a consequence, welfare effects of UI can be assessed without any
direct estimation of the consumption smoothing benefits of UI from consumption
data, which can prove arduous. Given the “local”12 nature of the Baily-Chetty
formula, the components of the welfare formula need to be statistics that can
be easily estimable, and preferably at high frequency, to be able to make readily
available policy recommendation. The interest of the proposed method is that,
as will become apparent in the empirical sections of the paper, all the relevant
statistics for welfare analysis are estimable with administrative UI data at high
frequency using the regression kink design.
The method of proposition 1 to uncover the moral hazard component of behav-
ioral responses relies on individuals’ optimality conditions, and in particular on
the Euler equations. A key advantage of this approach is that it does not require
any knowledge about individuals’ risk aversion or discount factors. In practice
though, it is therefore important to test the assumption that the credit constraint
is not yet binding after B periods so that the Euler equations actually hold. In
section A.8, I provide a simple test of this assumption using post-exhaustion
behavior with administrative data. More fundamentally, the method proposed
here to identify moral hazard and liquidity effects relies on the assumption that
12Local here means in the neighborhood of the actual policy parameters, where the statistics entering
the formula are estimated.
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the unemployed are rational and forward-looking. If individuals were perfectly
myopic for instance, the Euler equation would not hold. The test about the slack-
ness of the liquidity constraint seems to indicate a certain degree of consumption
smoothing over time, ruling out perfect myopia. But evidence in the labor mar-
ket (see for instance DellaVigna and Paserman [2005]) indicates that job seekers
may exhibit a lot of impatience. Even though our identification strategy is valid
independently of the value of the discount factor, it rules out the possibility of
forms of impatience such as hyperbolic (beta-delta) discounting.
My identification strategy also necessitates that individuals have very precise
information about their benefit level and potential duration of UI. This seems to
be the case nowadays, unemployed individuals receiving in most states at the be-
ginning of their claim a summary of their rights, with the amount of their weekly
benefits and total duration of benefits in weeks13. Finally, my identification strat-
egy postulates that unemployed individuals are able to form rational expectations
about their survival rates and expected duration of unemployment at the start of
a spell. Evidence in the labor market also suggests that unemployed individuals
may actually exhibit biased perceptions about their unemployment risks (Spin-
newijn [2010]). It is unfortunately difficult to know to what extent such biased
beliefs are likely to affect my estimates, since the moral hazard estimate is at
the same time an increasing function of the expected duration of unemployment
and a decreasing function of the expected survival rate at exhaustion. In other
words, biased beliefs would not affect my estimate if the bias is a simple shifter
of the survival curve. If this is not the case, one would need to compare the full
(biased) expected survival curve to the true survival curve to know how these
biased perceptions affect the moral hazard and liquidity estimates.
II. Empirical implementation
The empirical challenge in applying the formula of proposition 1 lies in the
difficulty to find credibly exogenous and time invariant sources of variations in UI
benefits. Most sources of variations used in the literature on US data come from
changes in state legislation over time14, with the issue that these changes might
be endogenous to labor market conditions. In this paper, I use the presence in
most US states of kinked schedules in the relationship between previous earnings
and both benefit level and benefit duration to estimate the responses of labor
supply to UI benefits using administrative data on UI recipients. This strategy
has several important advantages. First, in contrast to studies using regional or
time variation in UI benefits, the RK design holds market-level factors constant,
such that I identify changes in the actual behavioral response, net of any market
level factors that may change over time or across regions. Second, the RK design
13Unfortunately, I was not able to find a copy of UI benefit summary for the period covered by the
CWBH, and could not confirm that such information was already present at the time.
14See for instance Meyer [1990] or Card and Levine [2000].
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allows me to identify behavioral responses with respect to both benefit level and
potential duration for the same workers in the same labor markets. Finally, my
empirical strategy, based on the use of administrative data, delivers high frequency
estimates of behavioral responses without the need for quasi-experimental policy
reforms, which is critical for welfare recommendations based on sufficient statistics
formula.
A. Institutional Background: Kinks in UI Schedules
In all US states, the weekly benefit amount b received by a compensated un-
employed is a fixed fraction τ1 of her highest-earning quarter (hqw) in the base
period (the last four completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the start
of the claim)15 up to a maximum benefit amount bmax:
b =
{
τ1 · hqw
bmax if τ1 · hqw > bmax
Figure 2 plots the evolution of the weekly benefit amount schedule in Louisiana
for the time period available in the CWBH data used in this paper. Note that the
maximum benefit amount has been increased several times in Louisiana, partly to
adjust to high inflation rates during the period16. The schedule applies based on
the date the UI claim was filed, so that a change in the maximum weekly benefit
amount does not affect the weekly benefit amount of ongoing spells. In Louisiana,
τ1 is equal to 1/25 which guarantees a constant replacement ratio of 52% of the
highest-earning quarter up to the kink, where the replacement ratio decreases.
The potential duration of benefits (number of weeks a claimant can collect UI
benefits) is determined by two rules. First, there is a maximum duration Dmax
that cannot be exceeded, usually 26 weeks. But the total amount of benefits that
a claimant is able to collect for a given benefit year is also subject to a ceiling,
which is usually determined as a fraction τ2 of total earnings in the base period
bpw. So the total amount of benefits collected is defined as:
B = min(Dmax · b, τ2 · bpw)
This ceiling in the total amount of benefits determines the duration of benefits,
since duration D = Bb is simply the total amount of benefits divided by the weekly
15Some states, such as Washington, use the average of the two highest-earning quarters in the base
period.
16Inflation was 13.3 percent in 1979, 12.5% in 1980, 8.9% in 1981, 3.8% in 1982 (source: BLS CPI
data).
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 13
benefit amount. Duration of benefits can therefore be summarized as17:
D =
{
Dmax
τ2 · bpwmin(τ1.hqw,bmax) if τ2 ·
bpw
min(τ1·hqw,bmax) ≤ Dmax
Duration is thus also a deterministic kinked function of previous earnings18, as
shown in Figure 3. All the details on the rules pertaining to the kinks in potential
duration are described in online appendix D.7. The rules for the determination
of benefit duration discussed above constitute the basis of the UI benefit system
(Tier I) that applies in each state. During recessions, and depending on state labor
market conditions, two additional programs superimpose on Tier I to extend the
potential duration of UI benefits. The first program is the permanent standby
Extended Benefit (EB) program, federally mandated but administered at the
state level (Tier II). On top of the EB program, federal extensions are usually
enacted during recessions (Tier III). These extensions may change the location
and size of the kink in the relationship between previous earnings and benefit
duration as shown in figure 3 in the case of Louisinia. Most importantly, benefit
extensions create non-stationarity in the potential duration of benefits over the
duration of a spell, which create an additional challenge for inference in the RK
design, as I discuss in section III.B.
B. Data
The data used is from Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) UI
records19. This is the most comprehensive, publicly available administrative UI
data set for the US. CWBH data contains the universe of unemployment spells
and wage records for five US states from the late 1970s to 1984. Records begin in
January 1976 for Idaho, in January 1979 for Louisiana, January 1978 for Missouri,
17Idaho is the only state in the CWBH data with different rules for the determination of benefit
duration.
18To give a concrete example, an unemployed individual in Louisiana during the period 1979 to 1983
will hit the maximum duration whenever her ratio of base period earnings to highest quarter of earnings
is larger than 2.8. An individual with a highest quarter of earnings of $3725 in 1979 for instance,
who is therefore hitting the maximum benefit amount ceiling will see her potential duration increase
by roughly .25 week for each additional $100 of base period earnings, up to the point where her base
period earnings is larger than $10430, at which point she will be hitting the maximum duration ceiling
of 28 weeks. Note also that the schedule of benefit level and benefit duration are related. In particular,
if bpw
min(hqw, bmax
τ1
)
≤ Dmax. τ1τ2 , then D = τ2 ·
bpw
min(τ1.hqw,bmax)
, so that potential duration is always
inferior to the maximum duration Dmax, but the relationship between duration and highest quarter
earnings hqw exhibits an upward kink at hqw = bmax
τ1
, which is also the point where the relationship
between the weekly benefit amount b and hqw is kinked. To deal with the issue, I always get rid of all
individuals with bpw
min(hqw, bmax
τ1
)
≤ Dmax. τ1τ2 when estimating the effect of benefit level, to avoid the
correlation between the location of the two kinks. I explain in detail in appendix D.7 how to deal with
the correlation between the two schedules, for all the various subcases.
19I am especially grateful to Bruce Meyer and Patricia M. Anderson for letting me access the CWBH
data.
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April 1980 for New Mexico and July 1979 for Washington20. This enables me to
replicate and successfully test for the validity of the RK design in many different
settings and labor market conditions. Two important advantages of the data are
worth noting. First, CWBH data provides accurate information on the level of
benefits, potential duration, previous earnings and work history over time. Given
the large degree of measurement error found in survey data, administrative data
like the CWBH are the only reliable source to implement identification strategies
such as the regression kink design 21. Second, the granularity of the CWBH data
is a key advantage and smaller samples of UI recipients would in general not
exhibit enough statistical power to detect any effect in a RK design.
I report in table 1 descriptive statistics for the CWBH sample used in my
RKD strategy for all five states. In terms of duration outcomes22, I focus on
four main outcomes: the duration of paid unemployment, the duration of claimed
unemployment, the duration of the initial spell as defined in Spiegelman, O’Leary
and Kline [1992] 23 and the duration of total non-employment. Note that the
latter can only be properly computed in Washington, which is the only state
where the wage records, matched to the UI records, contain information about
reemployment dates.
Table 1 also reveals large variation in the generosity of UI benefits across states.
The average weekly benefit level (in $2010) varies from $225 in Missouri to $305 in
Louisiana, while the average potential duration varies from 20 weeks in Idaho to
27 weeks in Washington. These differences are due to variations in the parameters
of the schedule (the maximum benefit amount, τ1, etc.). For the purpose of the
RKD estimation, this has the advantage of creating substantial variation in the
location of the kink (relative to the distribution of earnings) across states: the
ratio of the kink point to the average hqw varies from .98 in Missouri to 1.65 in
Louisiana, with a fraction of unemployed at the maximum benefit amount varying
from .64 to .35. This mitigates the concern that RKD estimates are just picking
a functional form dependence between the outcome of interest and the running
variable that would be consistent across states.
In terms of external validity, it is interesting to note that the overall structure
of the UI system has remained almost unchanged since the period covered by
the CWBH. The slope of the UI schedule has remained the same in almost all
20For all details on the CWBH dataset, see for instance Moffitt [1985a]
21Administrative data was also supplemented by a questionnaire given to new claimants in most
states participating to the CWBH project, which gives additional information on socio-demographic
characteristics of the claimants such as ethnicity, education, spouse’s and dependents’ incomes, capital
income of the household, etc
22Unemployment Insurance claims are observed at weekly frequencies in the administrative data so
that all duration outcomes are measured and expressed in weeks
23The duration of claimed unemployment corresponds to the number of weeks a claimant is observed
in the administrative data for a given unemployment spell. This duration differs from the duration of
paid unemployment. First, because most states have instated waiting periods, and second, because a
lot of spells exhibit interruptions in payment with the claimant not collecting any check for a certain
number of weeks without being observed in the wage records. The initial spell, as defined in Spiegelman,
O’Leary and Kline [1992], starts at the date the claim is filed and ends when there is a gap of at least
two weeks in the receipt of UI benefits.
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US states over the past thirty years. The generosity of the UI system has only
been affected by the evolution of the other parameters of the schedule, and in
particular of the maximum benefit amount. Some states, such as Louisiana, are
less generous today than they are in the CWBH data: the average replacement
rate is .47 in the CWBH data, while it is around .395 in 201224. But overall,
with average replacement rates ranging between .43 and .47 across states, the
generosity of UI benefits in the CWBH data is very similar to today’s, with an
average replacement rate of .466 in the US in 2012. This means that the location
of the kink in the distribution of earnings is roughly similar today to that in the
CWBH data. The only notable difference concerns the tax status of UI benefits.
Prior to 1979, UI benefits were not subject to Federal income taxation, but in
1979 they became taxable for high income individuals and in 1987 benefits became
taxable for all recipients. It is finally interesting to note that the composition of
the UI recipients in the CWBH is relatively close to that of UI recipients during
the Great Recession as can be seen for instance from Table 2.1 in Krueger and
Mueller [2011].
C. Regression Kink Design
To identify the effect of UI benefit level and UI potential duration on search
outcomes, I use the kinks in the schedule of UI benefits following a sharp RK
design25. Identification relies on two assumptions. First, the direct marginal effect
of the assignment variable on the outcome should be smooth. Second, density of
the unobserved heterogeneity should evolve smoothly with the assignment variable
at the kink. This local random assignment condition seems credible in the context
of UI as few people may know the schedule of UI benefits while still employed26.
Moreover, to be able to perfectly manipulate ex ante one’s position in the schedule
of both benefit level and potential duration, it is necessary to know continuously
one year in advance the date at which one gets fired and the schedule that shall
apply then27 and to optimize continuously not only one’s highest-earning quarter
but also the ratio of base period earnings to the highest-earning quarter. I provide
in the next section further empirical evidence in support of the RKD assumptions.
As explained in Card et al. [2012], the denominator of the RKD estimand
is deterministic28, so that RKD estimation only relies on the estimation of the
numerator of the estimand which is the change in the slope of the conditional
24The replacement rate is defined as the weekly benefit amount divided by the weekly wage in the high-
est quarter of earnings. The figures for recent state UI replacement rates come from the Department of La-
bor and can be found at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp
25There has been recently a considerable interest for RK designs in the applied economics literature.
References include Nielsen, Sandoslash;rensen and Taber [2010], Card et al. [2012], Dong [2010] or Si-
monsen, Skipper and Skipper [2010]. The term sharp RK design means that everyone is a complier and
obeys the same treatment assignment rule.
26Unfortunately, apart from anecdotal evidence, there is very little data on individuals’ information
on UI schedules in order to fully substantiate this point.
27As shown in figures 2 and 3, the schedule changes rather frequently.
28It is the change in the slope of the schedule at the kink.
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expectation function of the outcome given the assignment variable at the kink.
This can be done by running parametric polynomial models of the form:
(10) E[Y |W = w] = µ0 + [
p¯∑
p=1
γp(w − k)p + νp(w − k)p ·D] where |w − k| ≤ h
where W is the assignment variable, D = 1[W ≥ k] is an indicator for being
above the kink threshold, h is the bandwidth size, and the change in the slope of
the conditional expectation function is given by ν1.
Note that the US is characterized by relatively low take-up rates of UI. In-
complete take-up may affect the validity of RK design if it causes the random
local assignment assumption to be violated. The RKD requires that the presence
of incomplete take-up does not generate a non-smooth relationship between the
assignment variable and unobserved heterogeneity at the kink point. This require-
ment is more likely to be met if some components of take-up are orthogonal to the
assignment variable. Empirical evidence from the CWBH period partly supports
this assumption. Blank and Card [1991] for instance show that unionization had
a large impact on take-up, which suggests that lack of information/ignorance sto-
ries played an important role in take-up behaviors in the 1980s. Note also that
because we only observe individuals who take-up UI in the CWBH data, the RKD
estimates should be interpreted as a treatment effect on the treated and not as
an Intention-To-Treat effect, in the sense that a change in the generosity of the
schedule may affect the selection of individuals in the CWBH sample.
III. Effect of UI benefits on unemployment duration
I present in this section results of the estimation of the effect on unemployment
duration of both UI benefit level and UI potential duration. The objective of
this section is also to assess the validity of the RK design to estimate these
elasticities. I propose and run several tests aimed at assessing both the validity
of the identifying assumptions, and the robustness of the RK estimates.
A. Benefit level
In the baseline analysis, I divide for each state all the unemployment spells in
subperiods corresponding to stable UI schedules. In figures 4, 5 and 6 and in the
robustness analysis of table A1 though, I group unemployment spells over all pe-
riods, which has the advantage of providing with a larger number of observations
at the kink for statistical power. For exposition purposes, I focus mainly on the
case of Louisiana but all the results for all states and periods are displayed in
online appendix B.
Graphical Evidence: I begin by showing graphical evidence in support of the
RKD assumptions. First, I plot the probability density function of the assignment
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variable in order to detect potential manipulation of the assignment variable at
the kink point. Figure 4 panel A shows the number of spells observed in each bin
of the highest quarter of earnings normalized by the kink point29 in Louisiana.
The graph shows no signs of discontinuity in the relationship between the number
of spells and the assignment variable at the kink point. To confirm this graph-
ical diagnosis, I also performed McCrary tests as is standard in the Regression
Discontinuity Design literature. The estimate for the log change in height and its
bootstrapped standard error are displayed directly on the graph and confirm that
we cannot detect a lack of continuity at the kink. I also extend the spirit of the
McCrary test to test the assumption of continuity of the derivative of the p.d.f,
as done in Card et al. [2012]. The idea is to regress the number of observations
Ni in each bin on polynomials of the average highest quarter of earnings in each
bin (centered at the kink) (w − k) and the interaction term (w − k) · 1[W ≥ k].
The coefficient on the interaction term for the first order polynomial (testing for a
change in slope of the p.d.f) reported on panel A of figure 4 is insignificant which
supports the assumption of a continuous derivative of the conditional density at
the kink.
A key testable implication of a valid RK design is that the conditional expecta-
tion of any covariate should be twice continuously differentiable at the kink. This
can be visually tested by plotting the mean values of covariates in each bin of the
assignment variable as done in figure 5 in Louisiana. Panels A, B, C and D of fig-
ure 5 all suggest that the covariates evolve smoothly at the kink, in support of the
identification assumptions of the RK design. In panel C., I investigate whether
differences in ex-ante savings behaviors may affect the local random assignment
assumption of the RK design. To do so, I exploit the information available in the
CWBH survey, which contains a reported measure of capital income and interests.
Although this is not a perfect measure of liquidity, this is a good proxy for the
availability of savings. Figure 5 panel C. displays the relationship between the
probability of having positive capital income and the assignment variable, which
does not exhibit any non-linearity at the kink. Formal tests for all covariates
can also be performed by running polynomial regressions of the form described
in equation 10. Results are described in the next subsection.
The pattern for the outcome variables offers a striking contrast with that of
covariates, as shown in figure 6 panel A which displays the evolution of the rela-
tionship between the duration of UI claims and the assignment variable normal-
ized at the kink. There is a sharp visible change in the slope of the relationship
between the duration of UI claims and the assignment variable at the kink point
of the benefit schedule. Figure 7 replicates the same graphical diagnosis for all
five states 30. This provides supportive evidence for the identification of an effect
29The choice of the bin size in our graphical analysis is done using the formal test of excess smoothing
recommended by Lee and Lemieux [2010] in the RD setting. A bin size of .05 is the largest that passes
the test for all states and outcomes of interest.
30Results for the other duration outcomes of interest are displayed in online appendix figures B2 and
B3 and reveal the exact same patterns.
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of benefit level on unemployment duration in the RK design.
Estimation Results: Table 2 shows the results for the baseline specification
of equation 10 in the linear case for Louisiana for all five sub periods. In each
column, I report the estimate of the weighted average treatment effect α̂ = − ν̂1τ1 ,
where ν̂1 is the estimated change in slope in the relationship between the outcome
and the assignment variable at the kink point from specification (10) and τ1 is
the deterministic change in slope in the schedule of UI benefits at the kink point.
Each estimate is done using nominal schedules, but the α̂ are rescaled to 2010
dollars and they should be interpreted as the effect of an extra dollar of 2010 in
weekly benefit amount on the average duration (in weeks) of the outcome31. The
coefficient estimate of .04 (table 2 column (3), sept 1981 to sept 1982) for instance
suggests that a $1 increase in weekly benefits leads to a .04 week increase in the
duration of paid unemployment.
I also report the elasticity with respect to the benefit level (εb = α̂ · bmaxY1 ,
where Y1 is mean duration at the kink point) and its robust standard error, as
well as the p-values from a Goodness-of-Fit test that consists in comparing the
polynomial model to the same polynomial model plus a series of bin dummies.
The results are consistent across the three duration outcomes of interest with an
estimated elasticity of between .2 and .7 depending on the sub period of interest.
These estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the average weekly benefit amount
increases on average by 2 to 7% the duration of unemployment. In each case,
the linear specification is not considered too restrictive compared to the model
including bin dummies as suggested by the large p-values of the Goodness-of-Fit
test. For covariates, to the contrary, I cannot detect evidence of a significant
change in the slope of the conditional expectation at the kink for any of the
five periods. In online appendix table B5, I display estimates of the elasticity
of all duration outcomes, including the duration of total non-employment, in
Washington, the only state for which we observe reemployment dates from wage
records in the CWBH data. Interestingly, the marginal effect of a change in
benefit level on the duration of non-employment is very similar to the effect on
the duration of UI claims or on the duration of paid UI. But the duration of
non-employment being usually quite longer than the duration of paid UI, the
elasticity of non-employment duration is relatively lower than the elasticity of
paid UI spells.
I provide various tests for the robustness of the RKD estimates. For the sake
of brevity, most of the details of these tests are given in appendix A. In table
A1 panel A, I begin by analyzing the sensitivity of the results to the choice of
the polynomial order. The estimates for α are of very similar magnitude for the
linear, the quadratic, and the cubic specification. Standard errors of the estimates
31The marginal effect α̂ estimated in the RK design is of course a local estimate for individuals at the
kink and might differ from the average treatment effect (ATE) for the whole population in the presence
of heterogeneity. α̂ is, to be precise, an average treatment effect weighted by the ex ante probability of
being at the kink given the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity across individuals.
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nevertheless increase quite substantially with higher order for the polynomial.
The AIC suggest that the quadratic specification is always dominated but the
linear and the cubic specification are almost equivalent, and none of them is too
restrictive based on the p-values of the Goodness-of-Fit test. Table A1 panel
B explores the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the bandwidth level.
Results are consistent across bandwidth sizes, but the larger the bandwidth size,
the less likely is the linear specification to dominate higher order polynomials.
Overall though, it should be noted that the RKD does pretty poorly with small
samples, and therefore is quite demanding in terms of bandwidth size compared
to a regression discontinuity design.
I then provide two tests to deal with the issue of functional dependence between
the forcing variable and the outcome of interest. A key identifying assumption of
the RK design is that, conditional on b, this relationship is smooth at the kink.
But in practice, it could be that the relationship between the forcing variable
and the outcome (in the absence of a kink in the schedule of b) is either kinked
or simply quadratic. Then, the RKD estimates are likely to be picking up this
functional dependence between y and w1 instead of the true effect of b on y. One
way to control for this type of issue would be to compare two groups of similar
individuals with different UI schedules, so that kinks would be at different points
of support of the forcing variable. As shown in online appendix A.3, under the
assumption that the functional dependence between y and w1 is the same for
the two groups, the average treatment effect can be identified and estimated in a
“double-difference regression kink design”.
To implement this strategy, the idea is to use the presence of variations in the
maximum benefit amount over time, that shift the position of the kink across the
distribution of the forcing variable (as shown in figure 2). The problem though
is that, taken separately, each variation in maxb is too small to give enough
statistical power to detect changes in slopes because the bandwidths are too small,
and as previously pointed out, the drawback of the RKD is to be quite demanding
in terms of bandwidth size. The idea therefore is to compare periods that are
further away in time32. Figure A2 in online appendix A shows the relationship
between the duration of paid unemployment and the forcing variable in 1979 and
1982. Interestingly, there is a kink in this relationship in 1979 at the level of the
1979-kink in the schedule, and this kink disappears in 1982, when a new kink
appears right at the level of the 1982-kink. Furthermore, in the interval between
the 1979 and 1982 kinks, there is a change in slope in the relationship between
the duration of unemployment and the forcing variable. This evidence is strongly
32The obvious drawback of this option is that the identifying assumption is less likely to hold as one
compares periods that are further away in time. In particular, one may worry about the high inflation
rates during this period. It is important to note here that the maximum benefit amount increased in
Louisiana a lot faster than inflation (40% between September 1979 and Sept 1982 and total inflation was
less than 20% during that period), so that there is a clear and important change in the schedule in real
terms. To further alleviate this concern, I also control for quadratic in real highest quarter of earnings
in the DD-RKD specifications and find similar results.
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supportive of the validity of the RK design. Table A2 reports the double-difference
RKD estimates of the effect of benefit level corresponding to the evidence of figure
A2. The point estimates are perfectly in line with the baseline RKD estimates of
table 2. The DD-RKD strategy being a lot more demanding, the precision of the
estimates is nevertheless quite reduced compared to the baseline RKD strategy.
Another way to test for the functional dependence between earnings and the
outcome is to run RKD estimates using as the forcing variable a placebo, i.e. a
proxy for previous earnings, that would not be too correlated with the highest
quarter of earnings. In the CWBH data, the variable that is best suited for this
strategy is the reemployment wage. Appendix Table A3 explores the robustness of
the RKD results using the post unemployment wage as a placebo forcing variable
instead of the pre-unemployment highest quarter of earnings. Results show that
we cannot detect any effect in these placebo specifications33.
I finally conduct a semi-parametric test inspired by the literature on the detec-
tion of structural breakpoints in time series analysis, following for instance Bai
and Perron [2003]. The principle of the test is to try to non-parametrically detect
the location of the kink by looking for the kink point that would minimize the
residual sum of squares or equivalently maximize the R-squared. Details of the
test are given in online appendix A.5. I report in figure A3 the evolution of the
R-squared as I change the location of the kink point in specification (10). The
evolution of the R-squared as one varies the location of the kink points provides
evidence in support of the validity of the RKD design. The R-squared increases
sharply as one moves closer to the actual kink point and then decreases sharply,
supportive of the existence of a kink around 0.
Comparison to other studies: I replicate the RKD estimation procedure
for all states and periods. All the estimates are displayed in appendix B. Overall,
estimates of the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the benefit
level are consistently between .1 and .7. The average elasticity of the duration of
initial spell for all 5 states and periods is .32 (standard deviation is .2), where each
period of analysis is defined as the entire period for which the benefit schedule is
left unchanged and which represents a total of 26 different estimates. To get a
sense of the validity of the RK design, it is useful to compare the RKD estimates
to existing estimates in the literature. My estimates are on the lower end of the
spectrum when compared to traditional benchmarks in the literature on US data.
Estimation of the effect of UI benefit level in this literature has however always
been struggling with the endogeneity issue due to the joint determination of UI
benefits and previous earnings. Most empirical studies on US data therefore use
33Ganong and Jaeger [2014] propose a clever alternative test for curvature in the relationship between
expected duration and previous earnings. The principle of the test is to use 4 part linear splines (therefore
with two placebo kinks) instead of a 2 part linear spline. Using all 26 state×period estimates, it is possible
to look at the distribution of estimates at the true kink and at two placebo kinks (one at $1000 and the
other at -$1000) in the 4 part linear splines. For the placebo kink at $1000, the median point estimate
is zero but not for the placebo kink at -$1000 kink which suggest some curvature of expected duration
with respect to earnings that may not be fully reflected in the conventional standard errors reported in
my estimates.
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proportional hazard models and add controls for previous earnings34. In table A4
in online appendix A.6, I report the estimates of Cox proportional hazard models
on the CWBH data35, which enables me to compare my results to the widely
cited benchmark of Meyer [1990], who used a smaller sample of the same CWBH
records. Appendix table A4 shows that the estimates of Meyer [1990], who found
an elasticity of .5636, can be fully replicated using his specification. The drawback
of these estimates is that they may not fully address the endogeneity issue due to
the joint determination of UI benefits and previous earnings. Meyer [1990] only
controls for previous wages using the log of the base period earnings. Interestingly,
if one adds a richer set of non parametric controls for previous earnings to mitigate
the concern of endogeneity, and fully controls for variations across labor markets
by adding time fixed effects interacted with state fixed effects, the results converge
to the RKD estimates and the elasticity goes down to around .3. The reason
is that, as one controls more efficiently for the functional dependence between
unemployment duration and previous earnings, the only identifying variation in
benefit level that is left comes from the kink in the benefit schedule, and the model
naturally converges to the identification strategy of the RKD. Taken together, the
results from these multiple robustness checks strongly support the validity of the
RK design.
B. Benefit Duration
The existence of unemployment insurance extensions due to the EB program
and the federal FSC program during the period covered by the CWBH creates
frequent changes in the schedule of potential duration37. The schedule for poten-
tial duration applies based on the date of the week of certified unemployment so
that changes in the schedule do usually affect ongoing spells. This complicates
the estimation of the effect of potential duration in the CWBH sample because
a fundamental requirement of the RK design is that the unemployed anticipate
the stationarity of the schedule during the whole duration of their spell. Only
observations for which the schedule did not change from the beginning of the
spell to the end of the potential duration can be kept in the estimation sample
for estimating the effect of potential duration on actual unemployment duration.
In Louisiana for instance, when I restrict the sample to spells with a stationary
schedule throughout the whole potential duration of the spell, I am left with only
34See for instance estimates in Chetty [2008], Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] or Spinnewijn [2010], and
surveys in Holmlund [1998] or Krueger and Meyer [2002]
35All the details of the estimation procedure are given in appendix A.6.
36See Meyer [1990], Table VI, column (7). Coefficient estimates for log(b) in the proportional hazard
models of table A4 can be interpreted as the elasticity of the hazard rate s with respect to the weekly
benefit level. However, under the assumption that the hazard rate is somewhat constant, these elasticities
can be easily compared to the RKD elasticities of unemployment duration, since D ≈ 1/s so that
εD ≈ −εs
37In Louisiana for instance the schedule changed 11 times between January 1979 and December 1983.
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3 sub periods38. Because of these constraints, the number of estimates for the
effect of potential duration is more limited than for the effect of benefit level.
The ratio of base period earnings (bpw) divided by highest quarter earnings
(hqw) is the assignment variable in the schedule of potential UI duration as ex-
plained in section II.A and plotted in figure 3. Figure 6 panel B plots the mean
values of the duration of UI claims in each bin of bpw/hqw and centered at the
kink in the schedule of potential duration. The graph provides evidence of a kink
in the relationship between the assignment variable and the duration of UI claims
at the kink in the schedule of potential duration. But the smaller sample size at
the kink makes the relationship between the outcome and the assignment variable
a little noisier visually than in the case of the kink in the benefit level schedule
depicted in figure 6.
Table 3 presents the results for the average treatment effect β̂ of a one week
increase in potential duration with robust standard errors for Louisiana. For each
of the three sub periods with stable schedules, I report the estimates of the pre-
ferred polynomial specification based on the Aikake Information Criterion. The
effect of an additional week of UI on average duration is consistently around .2
to .4 for all duration outcomes and sub-periods of interest. The linear specifi-
cation is always preferred and is never rejected by the Goodness-of-Fit test as
indicated by the reported p-values. For covariates in columns (4) to (8), to the
contrary, the same estimation procedure does not reveal any kink in the relation-
ship with the assignment variable, which supports the validity of the RK design.
Note that the average duration of UI claims when benefit exhaust after B weeks
and S(t) is the survival rate at time t is: DB =
B−1∑
t=0
S(t). The effect of a one
week increase in the potential duration of unemployment benefits dB on the av-
erage duration of UI claims is dDBdB =
B−1∑
t=0
dS(t)
dB
+ S(B), which is the sum of a
behavioral response
∑B−1
t=0
dS(t)
dB and of the mechanical effect S(B) of truncating
non-employment durations one week later. The average exhaustion rate for all
UI tiers S(B) is between 11% and 18% as shown in table 1. This suggests that
the .2 - .4 week estimated response is not entirely driven by the mechanical effect,
but that only a half to two-third of the estimated response can be attributed to
the behavioral response.
The estimates of an increase of .2 to .4 weeks of unemployment with each
additional week of UI, which translates into an elasticity of unemployment claims
with respect to potential duration of .4 to .8, are in line with previous estimates
in the US such as Moffitt [1985b], Card and Levine [2000], and Katz and Meyer
[1990]. They are higher than existing estimates in Europe using RD designs such
38The first sub period contains all spells beginning between 01/14/1979 and 01/31/1980, the second
contains all spells beginning between 09/12/1981 and 05/01/1982, and finally the third sub period
contains all spells beginning after 06/19/1983 to 31/12/1983.
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as Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender [2012] for Germany. This could be due
to much longer baseline durations in European UI systems. In Schmieder, von
Wachter and Bender [2012] for instance, baseline potential durations, at which
the effect of an extension of UI are estimated, are between 12 to 24 months, which
is 2 to 4 times longer than in the US. They are also larger than the estimates of
Rothstein [2011], who finds very small effects of UI extensions during the Great
Recession. His identification strategies however might be picking up equilibrium
effects in the labor market, which might be lower during recessions in the presence
of negative job search externalities as suggested in Landais, Michaillat and Saez
[2010].
IV. Moral hazard, liquidity and welfare calibrations
A. Liquidity effects and calibrations
To calibrate the welfare effects of UI following the (transformed) Baily-Chetty
formula of Chetty [2008], I need estimates of the elasticities of paid unemploy-
ment duration and of total non-employment duration, as well as estimates of the
liquidity to moral hazard ratio. In the CWBH data, Washington is the only state
for which information on total non-employment duration is available through the
matched UI records-wage records. I therefore now restrict interest to Washington.
To compute the liquidity to moral hazard ratio, one needs to estimate at the same
time the effect of benefit level and that of potential duration. I therefore focus
on the longest period (July 1980 to July 1981) for which we have a stationary
schedule in Washington for both benefit level and potential duration. In table 4,
I give in column (1) and (2) RKD estimates of the elasticities for the period of
interest in Washington.
Estimation of liquidity and moral hazard effects: The estimation of
liquidity and moral hazard effects follows from the application of the result of
proposition 1. The result of proposition 1 relies on the assumption that the
liquidity constraint is not yet binding at the exhaustion point B. I provide in
online appendix A.8 a simple test for this assumption. The intuition for the test is
the following. If the liquidity constraint is binding, it means that the unemployed
can no longer deplete their asset; they are hand-to-mouth, and therefore, benefits
that they have received in the past do not have any effect on their future behavior.
If to the contrary, exit rates after the exhaustion point are affected by benefits
received before exhaustion, it means that agents can still transfer part of their
consumption across time periods. Results, reported in the appendix, show that
one additional dollar of UI before 39 weeks reduces the exit rate of unemployment
after exhaustion, between 40 weeks and 60 weeks, by a statistically significant .2
percentage point. These estimates suggest that the Euler equation holds and that
variations in benefits prior to exhaustion affect exit rate of unemployment after
the exhaustion point.
24 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL AUGUST 2014
In practice, to implement the result of the result of proposition 1, I estimate
separately in the regression kink design the effect of an increase in benefit level
( ∂s0∂b
∣∣∣
B
) and of an increase in potential duration (∂s0∂B ) on the hazard rate out
of unemployment at the beginning of a spell39. Proposition 1 requires that we
estimate the effect of benefit level and potential duration for the same individuals.
To ensure that the characteristics of individuals at both kinks (in benefit level
and potential duration) are the same, I use a re-weighting approach described
in online appendix A.10. Column (3) of table 4 reports ( 1B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣
B
− 1b ∂s0∂B ), the
difference between the RKD estimate of the effect of benefit level (divided by
the potential duration) and the RKD estimate of the effect of potential duration
(divided by the benefit level) on s0. Standard errors for all statistics in column (3)
are bootstrapped with 50 replications40. By a simple application of proposition 1,
this difference is then divided by Φ1 = −S
B
1 −S1(B)
DB1
to compute the moral hazard
effect Θ1 of an increase in benefit level and the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard
ρ1 in the effect of an increase in benefit level. I use the observed average survival
rates and durations for the full period July 1980 to July 1981 in Washington and
for individuals at the kink of benefit level in order to compute Φ1.
The estimate reported in column (3) suggests the existence of substantial liq-
uidity effects, with a ratio of liquidity effect to moral hazard effect of 88%. This
estimate is however smaller than the figures reported in Chetty [2008], who finds
a ratio of roughly 1.5 using data on severance payments. The great advantage of
the RKD strategy is to be able to estimate liquidity effects from administrative
UI data directly, without the need for information on severance payments or for
consumption data.
Calibrations I now use these estimates to calibrate the welfare effects of UI.
The optimal UI formulas expressed in terms of ratio of liquidity to moral hazard
are presented, derived and explained in online appendix C.4 and C.5. To calibrate
the Insured Unemployment Rate DB/(T − D), I use the total number of paid
unemployed divided by the total number of employees paying payroll taxes in
the wage records in Washington for the period July 1980 to July 1981. This
yields DB/(T − D) ≈ 3.9%. Similarly, I calibrate D/T − D ≈ 8.5% as the
average unemployment rate in Washington during the period computed from
CPS41. ω1 =
B
DB−s0(B−1) − 1 ≈ 17 is calibrated directly from the CWBH data
39To increase the precision of the estimates, I define s0 as the probability of exiting unemployment
in the first 4 weeks. Shorter definitions for period 0 yield similar results but the standard errors on the
estimates of the effect of potential duration increase sharply.
40To be precise, I merge observations from both samples, the one at the benefit level kink and the
one at the potential duration kink, and draw with replacement 50 different samples from that merged
sample. I then replicate the full estimation procedure from these 50 samples to compute the standard
errors on ( 1
B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣
B
− 1
b
∂s0
∂B
), Θ1 and ρ1.
41The way I calibrate the ratios DB/(T −D) and D/T −D relies on the assumption, implicit in the
model, that each state UI agency balances its own budget every period. This assumption is somewhat
restrictive, since the federal government subsidizes state UI agencies in practice. In particular, half of
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in Washington. Plugging the estimated elasticities of column (2) of table 4 into
formula (31) of the appendix yields the right-hand side of the optimal formula
ω1
DB
T−D (1 + εDB + εD
D
T−D ) ≈ 1.14. With a ratio of liquidity to moral hazard
ρ1 ≈ .88, it means that the left-hand side of the formula (1 +ρ1 ≈ 1.88) is greater
than the right-hand side. This indicates that increasing the benefit level from
its current level would be welfare increasing42. Similarly, one can calibrate the
formula for the welfare effects of the potential duration of UI, derived in online
appendix C.5. Under the approximation that ρ2 ≈ ρ1, and given that in the
CWBH data, ω2/B ≈ 14.2, the right-hand side of equation (33) is approximately
equal to 1.29, which is again lower than the left-hand side of the formula. Once
again, the result of this calibration suggest that a small increase in the potential
duration of UI would be welfare increasing.
V. Conclusions
This paper has shown how, in the tradition of the dynamic labor supply litera-
ture, one can identify the moral hazard and liquidity effects of UI using variations
along the time profile of UI benefits brought about by exogenous variations in the
benefit level as well as in the benefit duration. My strategy only relies on exploit-
ing individuals’ first order conditions and variations in the time profile of benefits,
which makes it easily generalizable and applicable to any other transfer program
with time-dependent benefits.
I have implemented this strategy using variations in UI benefit level and UI
benefit duration in the RK design. Overall, my results confirm the evidence in
Chetty [2008] that liquidity effects are substantial, and that an increase in the
replacement rate and duration of UI might be welfare increasing43 The advantage
of calibrating the welfare formula using the regression kink design as described in
this paper, is that the formula can technically be tested in real time, so that any UI
administration could easily estimate the welfare effects of the small adjustments
that are usually done in UI legislation such as a change in the maximum benefit
amount.
Yet, the calibrations presented here are obtained in a very stylized version of
the labor market44. Models in the tradition of Baily [1978] and Chetty [2006]
such as the one presented here take a pure partial equilibrium view of the labor
the cost of EB extensions is paid by the federal budget.
42Note that the Baily formula focuses on the optimal UI benefit level net of all taxes. The switch
operated in the 1980s towards making UI benefit part of the income tax base may have reduced the
net-of-tax benefit level even further from the optimal benefit level b obtained from my calibration.
43It is important however to remember that these policy recommendations are only valid locally, at
the value of the policy parameters at which the statistics entering the formula are estimated. Extrapo-
lating the optimal level of benefit and duration of UI from these statistics would require the implausible
assumption that all statistics would remain unchanged if we were to modify the policy parameters.
44Note for instance that calibrations have assumed perfect take-up of UI. As shown in Kroft [2008], in
the presence of responses to UI at the extensive margin with endogenous take-up costs, social multiplier
effects arise and the optimal replacement rates can be substantially higher than in traditional models
with responses only along the intensive margin.
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market, with an infinitely elastic labor demand. The unemployment problem is
represented as a pure labor supply story, with no effect of UI on labor market equi-
librium through labor demand effects. As shown in Landais, Michaillat and Saez
[2010], in equilibrium search-and-matching models of the labor market, partial
equilibrium labor supply responses to UI are no longer sufficient to compute the
optimal trade-off between insurance and moral hazard, and one needs to estimate
equilibrium employment responses as well.
Figure 1. Backing out moral hazard effects in dynamic labor supply models
A. Standard dynamic labor supply model
time
(1-t).w
-dt
Permanent tax decrease -dt = 
Change from one wage profile to another
Behavioral response = 
Frisch + wealth effects 
time
(1-t).w
-dtj -dtk
Two tax changes with similar wealth effect
 -dtj = -dtk
-dtj affects labor supply at time j through 
Frisch + wealth effect
-dtk affects labor supply at time j only 
through wealth effect
Back out Frisch elasticity 
B. Dynamic UI model
time
benefits
b
B
b + db
Chetty ['08]
Change in benefit level db 
= moral hazard + liquidity effect
time
benefits
B
b + db
dB
Variation in benefit level and duration 
that both give one extra $ to unemployed:
B.db = b.dB
Back out moral hazard effect
Need to account for state dependance: 
gets dB only if still unemployed at time B
Notes: The figure explains the decomposition of tax / UI benefits changes into wealth effects and moral hazard (or
Frisch) effects, and the relationship between the “Macurdy critique” (MaCurdy [1981]) and the liquidity vs moral
hazard decomposition of Chetty [2008]. Panel A-left, shows the effect of a permanent tax change on the wage profile
of an individual: the net return to work is affected every period, but so will the expected lifetime wealth of the
individual. The behavioral response of labor supply to this tax change will be a mix of wealth and Frisch effects. In
panel A-right, a marginal tax change at time j and a marginal tax change at time k will have a similar wealth effect
on labor supply at time j, but the marginal tax change at time k will only affect labor supply at time j through the
wealth effect. Comparing the effect of these two tax changes on labor supply at time j will therefore identify Frisch
effects (MaCurdy [1981]). Panel B plots a change in the benefit level db received by the unemployed for the first B
periods in a two-tier UI benefits system. This change in benefit is a full shift of the profile of the return to search
effort, as in panel A-left, and its effects on search effort will be a mix of wealth effects and of distortionary “Frisch”
effects (or moral hazard effects, Chetty [2008]). But the idea of exploiting variations in the net return to search
effort at different points in time can also be implemented using variations in benefit level db and in the potential
duration of benefits dB as shown in panel B-right. The only difference is the presence of state-dependence: search
effort today affects in which state one will be tomorrow. When increasing potential duration dB, one only gets the
higher benefits if still unemployed after B periods. Because of this, variations in future benefits do not only have
an effect on current job search effort through the marginal utility of wealth, but also through the net return to
search effort today. The difference in the effect of current and future benefits on search effort today only identifies
the moral hazard effect up to a term that depends on the ex-ante survival function, as shown in proposition 1.
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Figure 2. Louisiana: Schedule of UI Weekly Benefit Amount, jan1979-Dec1983
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Source: Louisiana Revised Statutes RS 23:1592 and yearly Significant Provisions of State Unemploy-
ment Insurance Laws 1976 to 1984, Dpt of Labor, Employment & Training Administration.
Note: The graph shows the evolution of the schedule of the weekly benefit amount (WBA) in nominal
terms as a deterministic and kinked function of the highest quarter of earnings in Louisiana. The schedule
applies based on the date the UI claim was filed, so that a change in the maximum weekly benefit amount
does not affect the weekly benefit amount of ongoing spells.
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Figure 3. Louisiana: Schedule of UI Potential Duration, jan1979-Dec1983
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Source: Louisiana Revised Statutes RS 23:1592 and weekly state trigger notice reports
Note: The graph shows the evolution of the schedule of the potential duration of UI benefits as a
deterministic and kinked function of the ratio of base period earnings to highest quarter of earnings in
Louisiana. The schedule applies based on the date of the week of certified unemployment so that changes
in the schedule do usually affect ongoing spells. In normal times, the potential duration is determined
by the regular state UI program (Tier 1). During recessions, and conditional on states’ labor market
conditions, two additional UI programs (Extended Benefit program, and Federal extensions) may extend
the potential duration over the maximum duration of Tier 1 which may affect the size and location of
the kink. The graph shows for instance the schedule applying during most of 1983 when both the EB
and Federal extensions (FSC-III and FSC-IV) were in place in Louisiana.
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Figure 4. RKD graphical evidence of the Effect of Unemployment Benefits: Duration of UI
Claims
A. Assignment variable: RKD for benefit level
McCrary Tests:
Discontinuity est.= .067 (.059)
1st deriv. discont. est.= 19.59 (40.62)
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B. Assignment variable: RKD for potential duration
McCrary Tests:
Discontinuity est.= -.139 (.099)
1st deriv. discont. est.= -216 (220.6)
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Notes: The graph assesses the validity of the assumptions of the RK design by testing graphically the
smoothness of the distribution of the assignment variable at the kink point in the UI schedules. Panel
A shows the probability density function of the assignment variable for the schedule of UI benefit level,
normalized at the kink point. Panel B shows the probability density function of the assignment variable
for the schedule of UI potential duration, centred at the kink point. I also display two tests of the
identifying assumptions of the RKD. The first is a standard McCrary test of the discontinuity of the
p.d.f of the assignment variable. I report here the log difference in height of the p.d.f at the kink. The
second is a test for the continuity of the first derivative of the p.d.f. I report here the coefficient estimate
of the change in slope of the p.d.f in a regression of the number of individuals in each bin on polynomials
of the assignment variable interacted with a dummy for being above the kink. See text for details.
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Figure 5. Distribution of Highest Quarter Earnings and Covariates, Louisiana
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C. Capital income D. Number of dependents
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Notes: The graphs test the validity of the smoothness assumptions of the RK design (for the first sub-period of analysis in Louisiana). For all 4 panels,
highest quarter of earnings, which is the assignment variable in the RK design for the estimation of the effect of benefit level, is normalized by the kink
point. The binsize is .05 and passes the test of excess smoothing recommended in Lee and Lemieux [2010]. Each panel shows the mean values of a different
covariate in each bin of the assignment variable. The graph shows evidence of smoothness in the evolution of covariates at the kink, in support of the RKD
identification assumptions. Formal tests of smoothness are displayed in table 2.
Figure 6. RKD graphical evidence of the Effect of Unemployment Benefits: Duration of UI
Claims, Louisiana 1979-1984
A. Effect of benefit level
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B. Effect of potential duration
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Notes: Panel A shows for the first sub-period of analysis in each state the mean values of the duration
of UI claims in each bin of highest quarter of earnings normalized at the kink point in the schedule
of the weekly benefit amount. The graph shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome
at the kink. Formal estimates of the kink using polynomial regressions of the form of equation 10 are
displayed in table 2. The red lines display predicted values of the regressions in the linear case allowing
for a discontinuous shift at the kink. Panel B shows the mean values of the duration of initial spell in
each bin of the ratio of base period earnings (bpw) divided by highest quarter earnings (hqw), which
is the assignment variable in the schedule of potential UI duration, and centered at the kink point in
the schedule. The graph shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome at the kink. Formal
estimates of the kink are displayed in table 3. The red lines display predicted values in the linear case
allowing for a discontinuous shift at the kink.
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Figure 7. RKD evidence of the Effect of Benefit Level: Duration of UI Claims vs Highest
Quarter Earnings for All 5 States
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10
11
12
13
14
Du
ra
tio
n 
of
 sp
ell
 (w
ks
)
.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Highest Quarter Earnings / Kink
16
18
20
22
24
Du
ra
tio
n 
of
 sp
ell
 (w
ks
)
.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Highest Quarter Earnings / Kink
Missouri New Mexico
11
12
13
14
15
Du
ra
tio
n 
of
 sp
ell
 (w
ks
)
.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Highest Quarter Earnings / Kink
11
12
13
14
15
Du
ra
tio
n 
of
 sp
ell
 (w
ks
)
.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Highest Quarter Earnings / Kink
Washington
16
17
18
19
20
Du
ra
tio
n 
of
 sp
ell
 (w
ks
)
.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Highest Quarter Earnings / Kink
Notes: The graph shows in each state the mean values of the duration of UI claims in each bin of highest
quarter of earnings normalized by the kink point in the schedule of the UI benefit level. The graph
shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome at the kink. Formal estimates of the kink using
polynomial regressions of the form of equation 10 are displayed in table 2 and appendix tables B2 to B5.
The red lines display predicted values of the regressions in the linear case allowing for a discontinuous
shift at the kink.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics for full CWBH sample
Idaho Louisiana
Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N
Duration Outcomes (wks)
Initial spell 13.8 12.3 33125 17.5 14.1 44702
wks UI paid 11.7 10.7 33125 17.3 13.8 44702
wks UI claim 15.8 12.2 33125 18.7 13.7 44702
Earnings and Benefits ($2010)
bpw 25163 22227 33125 26894 19029 44702
hqw 9835 16463 33125 9538 6228 44702
wba 261.8 86.3 33125 305.2 115.8 44702
pot. duration Tier I 20 5.5 33125 24.9 4.3 44702
kink / avg hqw 1.44 .9 33125 1.65 1.35 44702
% with max b .37 .48 33125 .35 .48 44702
% with max D .31 .46 33125 .64 .48 44702
Avg repl. rate .44 .12 33125 .47 .09 44702
Exhaustion rate .11 .29 33125 .13 .31 44702
Covariates
age 30.2 12.8 33121 34.6 12.6 44373
male .67 .47 33121 .7 .46 44058
educ. (yrs) 12 2.2 17627 11.4 2.7 41308
dependents 2 1.6 18688 2.1 1.6 22525
Missouri New Mexico
Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N
Duration Outcomes (wks)
Initial spell 12.2 10.9 28599 14 12.6 27004
wks UI paid 12.5 11.4 28599 13.4 12.8 27004
wks UI claim 15.4 11.8 28599 15.8 12.6 27004
Earnings and Benefits ($2010)
bpw 23756 17346 28599 23334 17132 27004
hqw 8218 5835 28599 8252 5382 27004
wba 224.9 51.4 28599 230 69.5 27004
pot. duration Tier I 22.1 5.2 28599 25.7 1 27004
kink / avg hqw .98 .74 28599 1.3 .8 27004
% with max b .64 .48 28599 .43 .5 27004
% with max D .52 .5 28599 .92 .27 27004
Avg repl. rate .45 .16 28599 .43 .11 27004
Exhaustion rate .18 .37 28599 .14 .32 27004
Covariates
age 34.8 12.7 28585 33.7 11.4 26924
male .61 .49 28597 .65 .48 27002
educ. (yrs) 11.3 2.2 1852 11.7 2.5 26482
dependents 2 1.6 21701 2.2 1.7 25534
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Table 1—(continued) Descriptive Statistics for full CWBH sample
Washington
Mean s.d. N
Duration Outcomes (wks)
Initial spell 17.6 15.4 41992
wks UI paid 16.2 14.8 41992
wks UI claim 18.9 15.4 41992
wks non-employed 27.9 16.3 38035
Earnings and Benefits ($2010)
bpw 31232 20380 41992
hqw 8982 5321 41992
wba 286.7 94.7 41992
pot. duration Tier I 27 4.2 41992
kink / avg hqw 1.49 1.2 41992
% with max b .37 .48 41992
% with max D .56 .5 41992
Avg repl. rate .47 .21 41992
Exhaustion rate .12 .31 41992
Covariates
age 34.2 11.9 41955
male .627 .484 41972
educ. (yrs) 12.4 2.4 41702
dependents 1.7 1.5 28834
Notes: The initial spell, as defined in Spiegelman, O’Leary and Kline [1992], starts at the date the claim
is filed and ends when there is a gap of at least two weeks in the receipt of UI benefits. The duration
of paid UI corresponds to the number of weeks a claimant receives unemployment compensation. The
duration of a UI claim is the number of weeks a claimant is observed in the administrative data for a
given unemployment spell. bpw is the base period earnings, and hqw is the highest quarter of earnings.
wba is the weekly benefit amount of UI. Potential duration Tier I is the potential duration of the regular
state UI program.
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Table 2—RKD Estimates of the effect of benefit level, Louisiana 1979-1983
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Duration of
Initial Spell
Duration
UI Claimed
Duration
UI Paid
Age Male Years of
Education
Number of
Dependents
Jan-Sep 1979
α .006 .007 .006 -.121 0 .002 .004
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.069) (.002) (.014) (.01)
εb .183 .228 .186
(.183) (.184) (.165)
p-value .216 .274 .283 .116 .506 .056 .262
N 2129 2129 2129 2117 2106 1953 1479
Sep 1979-Sep 1980
α .018 .019 .018 .052 -.001 .003 -.001
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.056) (.002) (.012) (.001)
εb .484 .518 .45
(.143) (.142) (.131)
p-value .589 .389 .499 .659 .041 .735 .742
N 3765 3765 3765 3752 3723 3483 2042
Sep 1980-Sep 1981
α .018 .019 .018 .054 .002 -.025 -.026
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.069) (0) (.016) (.01)
εb .455 .467 .422
(.147) (.148) (.135)
p-value .007 .003 .006 .509 .064 .992 .908
N 3133 3133 3133 3116 3089 2932 1849
Sep 1981-Sep 1982
α .042 .038 .04 .051 -.001 0 0
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.059) (.002) (.014) (.014)
εb .708 .665 .644
(.154) (.154) (.142)
p-value .091 .178 .108 .43 .595 .314 .28
N 3845 3845 3845 3823 3786 3553 1351
Sep 1982-Dec 1983
α .047 .046 .042 -.013 -.001 .001 -.001
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.001) (.001) (.001)
εb .757 .763 .667
(.103) (.105) (.098)
p-value .199 .175 .084 .64 .508 .261 .843
N 6602 6602 6602 6558 6520 6078 3531
Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect
of benefit level on the outcome. Robust standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. The
elasticity of the three duration outcomes with respect to the UI benefit level εb = α̂ · bmaxY1 , where Y1 is
mean duration at the kink point, are also reported. P-values are from a test of joint significance of the
coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in
equation 10. All estimates are for the linear case. Each period corresponds to a stable schedule for the
benefit level (cf. figure 2).
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Table 3—Baseline RKD Estimates of the effect of potential duration, Louisiana
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Duration of
Initial Spell
Duration
UI Claimed
Duration
UI Paid
Age Years of
Education
Male Dependents
Period 1: Jan 1979 - Jan 1980
β .21 .184 .211 -.277 .013 .006 -.027
(.113) (.114) (.111) (1.609) (.03) (.006) (.024)
εB .413 .363 .38
(.223) (.225) (.2)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1 3 1 1 1
p-value .557 .484 .471 .338 .087 .511 .022
N 3497 3497 3497 3476 3216 3465 2208
Period 2: Sep 1981 - Apr 1982
β .349 .352 .335 -.251 .005 .002 -.023
(.141) (.138) (.136) (.135) (.029) (.005) (.03)
εB .793 .804 .71
(.32) (.315) (.289)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
p-value .133 .149 .107 .486 .493 .842 .388
N 2165 2165 2165 2148 1959 2138 888
Period 3: Jun 1983 - Dec 1983
β .387 .363 .334 -.061 -.014 .006 -.125
(.088) (.086) (.085) (.079) (.019) (.003) (.061)
εB .854 .851 .708
(.194) (.201) (.181)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
p-value .675 .751 .742 .624 .898 .493 .754
N 2936 2936 2936 2917 2720 2904 1601
Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. β is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of potential duration
on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of β are in parentheses. P-values are from a test of joint significance of
the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The
optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake Information Criterion.
Table 4—RKD estimates of behavioral responses to UI and liquidity and moral hazard effect estimates, Washington, Jul 1980 - Jul 1981
(1) (2) (3)
Effect Effect Liquidity and moral
of benefit level of potential duration hazard estimates
εDB .730 1.348
(.110) (.685)
[.814] [.388]
εD .291 .330
(.071) (.425)
[.392] [.474]
( 1B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣
B
− 1b ∂s0∂B )× 103 -.042
(.01)
Moral Hazard: .0014
Θ1 (.0001)
Liquidity to Moral Hazard: .876
ρ1 (.022)
N 6061 2049 9471
Notes: For all columns, standard errors for the estimates are in parentheses. P-values are reported between brackets and are from a test of
joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10.
Results are obtained from a linear specification. The bandwidth for the RK estimate of benefit level is 2500 (assignment variable: highest
quarter of earnings) and .75 for the RK estimate of the potential duration (assignment variable: ratio of base period to highest quarter
of earnings). This table shows how to use the RKD to estimate all the statistics needed to calibrate the welfare effects of UI. Column (1)
reports the RKD estimate of the elasticity of UI duration (εDB ) and of the elasticity of non-employment duration (εD) with respect to
benefit level. Column (2) reports the RKD estimate of the same elasticities with respect to potential duration. Column (3) reports the
liquidity and moral hazard effect estimates following the strategy detailed in proposition 1. ( 1
B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣
B
− 1
b
∂s0
∂B
) is the difference between the
RKD estimate of the effect of benefit level (divided by the potential duration) and the RKD estimate of the effect of potential duration
(divided by the benefit level) on s0 defined as the exit rate out of unemployment in the first 4 weeks of unemployment. To ensure that the
characteristics of individuals at both kinks (in benefit level and potential duration) are the same, I use a reweighing approach described in
appendix B. Following proposition 1, this difference is then used to compute the moral hazard effect Θ1 of an increase in benefit level and
the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard ρ1 in the effect of an increase in benefit level. For the three statistics of column (3), bootstrapped
s.e. with 50 replications are in parentheses. See text for additional details.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
Not for publication
A. Additional Results, Figures and Tables on the Robustness of the RK
Design
1. Sensitivity of RKD estimates to bandwidth and polynomial order.
In table A1 panel A, I begin by analyzing the sensitivity of the results to the
choice of the polynomial order. I group unemployment spells over all five periods
periods, which has the advantage of providing with a larger number of obser-
vations at the kink for statistical power. I display the results of the estimation
of equation 10 for a linear, a quadratic, and a cubic specification. For all three
specifications, the bandwidth is set at 2500. I also report the Aikake Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC) for all specifications. The estimates for α are of similar
magnitude across the different specifications. Standard errors of the estimates
nevertheless increase quite substantially with higher order for the polynomial.
The AIC suggest that the quadratic specification is always dominated but the
linear and the cubic specification are almost equivalent, and none of them is too
restrictive based on the p-values of the Goodness-of-Fit test. Table A1 panel B
explores the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the bandwidth level. Results
are consistent across bandwidth sizes, but the larger the bandwidth size, the less
likely is the linear specification to dominate higher order polynomials. Overall
though, it should be noted that the RKD does pretty poorly with small sam-
ples, and therefore is quite demanding in terms of bandwidth size compared to a
regression discontinuity design. In practice, I found that the precision and con-
sistency of the estimates would fall quite substantially when reducing bandwidth
sizes below 1500.
Table A1—Sensitivity analysis of the RKD Estimates, Effect of Benefit Level, Louisiana Sept 81- Dec 83
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Sensitivity to Poly Order B. Sensitivity to Bandwidth
Duration of
Initial Spell
Duration
UI Paid
Duration
UI Claimed
Duration of
Initial Spell
Duration
UI Paid
Duration
UI Claimed
Poly Order=1 Bandwidth=1500
α .030 .029 .028 α .040 .038 .037
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.006) (.006) (.006)
AIC 159415 159042 158408 AIC 93187 92986 92579
Opt. poly 1 1 1
Poly Order=2 Bandwidth=2500
α .056 .054 .055 α .040 .043 041
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.032) (.031) (.031)
AIC 159414 159042 158407 AIC 159412 159041 158405
Opt. poly 3 3 3
Poly Order=3 Bandwidth=4500
α .040 .043 .041 α .047 .043 .046
(.032) (.031) (.031) (.015) (.015) (.015)
AIC 159412 159041 158405 AIC 209792.15 209296 208492
Opt. poly 3 3 3
Notes: The table explores the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the polynomial order (panel A) and of the bandwidth (panel B) for
the regression specification in equation 10. In panel A, the bandwidth level is equal to 2500 for all specifications. α is the RK estimate of the
average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. AIC is the Aikake Information
Criterion.
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2. RKD for effect of UI benefits on the hazard rate at different points of the hazard
support.
The advantage of the RKD setting is that it can easily be extended to the
estimation of the effect of unemployment benefits on the hazard rate at different
points of the hazard support.
Let st = Pr[Y = t|Y ≥ t,W = w] define the hazard rate at time t conditional
on the assignment variable, I am interested in the average effect on the hazard
rate of a continuous regressor b 45:
αt =
∂st(Y |W = w)
∂b
Under the assumption that ∂st(Y |W=w)∂w |b=b(w) is smooth, the logic of the RK
design can be extended to identification of αt and we have:
αt =
limw→k+1
∂st(Y |W=w)
∂w − limw→k−1
∂st(Y |W=w)
∂w
limw→k+1
∂b(w)
∂w − limw→k−1
∂b(w)
∂w
Estimation of αt is done by estimating the numerator of the estimand, with a
linear probability model of the following form:
(11)
Pr[Y = t|Y ≥ t,W = w] = µt,0+[
p¯∑
p=1
γt,p(w−k)p+νt,p(w−k)p·D] where |w − k| ≤ h
where νt,1 gives once again the numerator of the RK estimand for the effect of
benefit level on the hazard rate at week t.
Figure A1 displays the RKD estimates of αt in Louisiana where I define hazard
rates as the probability of exiting unemployment each month. The graph shows
that having higher benefits has a negative impact on the probability of exiting
unemployment, and that this effect is particularly strong at the beginning of a
spell.
Note that the assumption that ∂st(Y |W=w)∂w |b=b(w) evolves smoothly at the kink
is actually relatively strong regarding the selection process (into remaining un-
employed) when unobserved heterogeneity θ also determines the exit rate out of
unemployment st({bt}Bt=0, θ). In fact, it implies that the heterogeneity effect is
additively separable, in which case ∀t, ∂2st∂bt∂θ = 0, meaning that the unobserved
heterogeneity only acts as a shifter, independently of UI benefits. Once again,
even though this smoothness assumption is fundamentally untestable, it is never-
theless always possible to check empirically for clear violations by looking for all
t at the smoothness of the p.d.f of the assignment variable (conditional on still
being unemployed after t weeks) around the kink, as well as at the smoothness
of the relationship between some covariates and the assignment variable (condi-
tional on still being unemployed after t weeks) around the kink.
45The same logic applies to effect of potential duration D.
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Figure A1. RKD estimates of the effect of benefit level on the hazard rate, Louisiana,
1979-1983
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Notes: The graph shows RKD estimates of αt =
∂st(Y |W=w)
∂b
, the effect of benefit level on the hazard
rate at time t. Time periods for the definition of the hazard rate are in months. The grey shaded area
represents the 95% confidence interval for the estimates. The graph shows that having higher benefits
has a negative impact on the probability of exiting unemployment, and that this effect is particularly
strong at the beginning of a spell.
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3. RKD in Double-Difference
One main issue with the identifying assumptions of the RK design concerns the
functional dependence between the forcing variable and the outcome of interest.
It could be that the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome
is either kinked or quadratic. Then estimates are likely to be picking up this
functional dependence between y and w1.
A simple way to understand the issue is to remember the basic intuition behind
the RK design. The model that I am interested in is y = f(b, w1, ε), where I want
to get an estimate of f ′1. In this model, we have:
dy
dw1
= f ′1
∂b
∂w1
+ f ′2 + f ′3
∂ε
∂w1
. The
RKD assumes that f ′2 and f ′3 are the same on both sides of the kink (smoothness
assumptions). Then, it follows that
∆
k+,k−
dy
dw1
∆
k+,k−
∂b
∂w1
identifies f ′1, because ∆
k+,k−
f ′2 = 0 and ∆
k+,k−
f ′3 = 0.
If the assumption of smoothness in the functional dependence between the forcing
variable and the outcome is violated, meaning that ∆
k+,k−
f ′2 6= 0 then, identification
is not possible in the standard RKD. But if we have two sets of observations A
and B for which we are willing to assume that ∆
k+,k−
f ′2 is the same, and for these
two groups
∆
k+,k−
∂b
∂w1
is different, then f ′1 is identified by αDD, where:
(12) αDD =
∆
A,B
∆
k+,k−
dy
dw1
∆
A,B
∆
k+,k−
∂b
∂w1
Such an identification strategy is reminiscent of double-difference strategies. In
practice it consists in comparing the change in slope at point k in the relationship
between the outcome and the forcing variable for two identical groups of obser-
vations, but one of the two groups is subject to a kink in the schedule of b at k,
and the other group is not.
To implement this strategy, the idea is to use the presence of variations in the
maximum benefit amount over time, that shift the position of the kink across the
distribution of the forcing variable (as shown in figure 2). The problem though is
that, taken separately, each variation in maxb is too small to give enough statisti-
cal power to detect changes in slopes because the bandwidths are too small, and
as previously pointed out, the drawback of the RKD is to be quite demanding
in terms of bandwidth size. The idea therefore is to compare periods that are
further away in time. The obvious drawback of this option is that the identifying
assumption is less likely to hold as one compares periods that are further away
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in time. In particular, one may worry about the high inflation rates during this
period. It is important to note here that the maximum benefit amount increased
in Louisiana a lot faster than inflation (40% between September 1979 and Sept
1982 and total inflation was less than 20% during that period), so that there is a
clear and important change in the schedule in real terms 46. Figure A2 shows the
relationship between the duration of paid unemployment and the forcing variable
in 1979 and 1982. Interestingly, there is a kink in this relationship in 1979 at the
level of the 1979-kink in the schedule, and this kink disappears in 1982, when a
new kink appears right at the level of the 1982-kink. Furthermore, in the interval
between the 1979 and 1982 kinks, there is a change in slope in the relationship
between the duration of unemployment and the forcing variable. This evidence
is strongly supportive of the validity of the RK design.
46To further alleviate this concern, I also control for quadratic in real highest quarter of earnings in
the DD-RKD specifications and find similar results.
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Figure A2. RKD in Double-Difference using variations in the maximum benefit level,
Louisiana, 1979 vs 1982
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Notes: The graph shows the average value of the duration of paid unemployment in each bin of the forcing
variable in 1979 (panel A) and 1982 (panel B). The maximum benefit amount has been increased by more
than 40% during the period, shifting the position of the kink in the schedule across the distribution of
the forcing variable, as shown by the two red bars indicating the position of the kink for the two periods.
The change in slope between the two periods in the interval between the two kinks is indicative of an
effect of b on y, and can be used to identify the average treatment effect of b in a double-difference RKD.
See text for details.
Table A2—Double-difference RKD estimates of the Effect of Benefit Level using variations in the maximum benefit level, Louisiana, 1979 vs 1982
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duration of
Initial Spell
Duration
UI Claimed
Duration
UI Paid
Duration of
Initial Spell
Duration
UI Claimed
Duration
UI Paid
A. 1979 Kink B. 1982 Kink
αDD .064 .088 .051 .065 .069 .05
(.035) (.035) (.035) (.034) (.034) (.034)
h− 2500 2500 2500 1400 1400 1400
h+ 1400 1400 1400 2500 2500 2500
Opt. Poly 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 6495 6495 6495 4744 4744 4744
Notes: The table reports the results of the implementation of a Double-Difference RKD using variations in the maximum
benefit amount over time, as described in the previous subsection. αDD is the Double-Difference RKD estimate of the
average treatment effect of benefit level as described in equation (12). It consists in comparing the change in slope at
point k in the relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable for two identical groups of observations, but
one of the two groups is subject to a kink in the schedule of b at k, and the other group is not. Standard errors for the
estimates of αDD are in parentheses. There are two sets of DD-RKD estimates, one for each kink. For the 1979-kink, I
compare the change in slope in the duration of unemployment spells at the level of the 1979-kink in the forcing variable
for the unemployed in 1979 (who had a schedule of benefit kinked at that point) against the unemployed in 1982 (who
had a continuous schedule of benefits at that point). For the 1982-kink, I compare the change in slope in the duration
of unemployment spells at the level of the 1982-kink in the forcing variable for the unemployed in 1982 (who had a
schedule of benefit kinked at that point) against the unemployed in 1979 (who had a continuous schedule of benefits at
that point). h− and h+ are the sizes of the lower and upper bandwidth. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based
on the minimization of the AIC.
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4. Placebo forcing variable
Another way to test for the existence of a kinked or quadratic functional depen-
dence between earnings and unemployment duration is to use a placebo forcing
variable. The placebo needs to be a good proxy for lifetime earnings, but must
not be too correlated with the highest quarter of earnings that determines the
benefit level. Table A3 explores the robustness of the RKD results by using
the post unemployment wage as a placebo forcing variable instead of the pre-
unemployment highest quarter of earnings. The post unemployment wage used
is the wage for the first quarter of full employment after an unemployment spell.
Post unemployment wages are available only for spells starting after Septem-
ber 1979 in Louisiana. Post unemployment wages are correlated with lifetime
earnings but are not too much correlated with the highest quarter of earnings
that determines the benefit level. Therefore, this table explores to what extent
the baseline results are driven by some functional dependence between earnings
and unemployment duration and shows that we cannot detect any effect in these
placebo specifications using post unemployment wages as a forcing variable.
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Table A3—Robustness: RKD Estimates of the effect of benefit level using post unemploy-
ment wage as the forcing variable, Louisiana
(1) (2) (3)
Duration of
Initial Spell
Duration
UI Claimed
Duration
UI Paid
Sep 79-Sep 80
α -.024 -.022 -.02
(.046) (.045) (.045)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1
Sep 80-Sep 81
α -.025 -.019 -.019
(.026) (.026) (.026)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1
Sep 81-Sep 82
α .026 .031 .019
(.034) (.033) (.033)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1
Sep 82-Dec 83
α .01 .009 .005
(.024) (.024) (.023)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1
Notes: The table explores the robustness of the RKD results by using the post unem-
ployment wage as a placebo forcing variable instead of the pre-unemployment highest
quarter of earnings. The post unemployment wage used is the wage for the first quarter
of full employment after an unemployment spell. Post unemployment wages are available
only for spells starting after September 1979 in Louisiana. Post unemployment wages
are correlated with lifetime earnings but are not too much correlated with the highest
quarter of earnings that determines the benefit level. Therefore, this table explores to
what extent the baseline results are driven by some functional dependence between earn-
ings and unemployment duration and shows that we cannot detect any effect in these
placebo specifications using post unemployment wages as a forcing variable. α is the RK
estimate of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors
for the estimates of α are in parentheses. The displayed estimates are for the optimal
polynomial order chosen to minimize the Aikake Information Criterion.
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5. Non-parametric tests for the the existence and location of a kink
An important concern in the RKD is that the estimates are picking up some
spurious breakpoints in the relationship between the forcing variable and the out-
come of interest. Despite their usually bad small sample properties, I recommend
that non-parametric or semi-parametric tests for the detection and location of
structural breakpoints are always performed when running RKD estimation, fol-
lowing the tests existing in the time series analysis literature, like for instance
Bai and Perron [2003]. The number of tests that one can implement is large, but
will usually fall within one of two categories. Tests for the existence of one or
several breakpoints. And tests trying to detect the location of these breakpoints.
By essence, testing for the statistical significance of the RKD estimates can be
seen as falling into the first category. One could nevertheless envisage testing for
the existence of more than one breakpoint, in order to make sure that the RKD
estimates are not driven by the existence of multiple kinks in the relationship
between the outcome and the forcing variable. An example of such tests can be
found in Bai and Perron [1998].
Here, I carry out a straightforward test that falls in the second category. I in-
tend to make sure that the real location of the kink in the schedule is the location
that would be detected if one were to look for the location of the kink in the
data without knowing where the kink actually stands. The test simply consists
in running the RKD specification47 of equation (10) for a large number of virtual
kink points k, and then in looking at the kink point that minimizes the residual
sum of squares or equivalently that maximizes the R-squared48. For efficiency, I
again group all unemployment spells for all periods together, and center the as-
signment variable at the kink point applicable given the schedule in place at each
particular time. Because of the large variance of unemployment durations across
individuals, I collapse the observations in bins of $50 of the assignment variable
in order to reduce the residuals sum of squares to begin with49. I report in figure
A3 the evolution of the R-squared as I change the location of the kink point in
specification (10). The evolution of the R-squared as one varies the location of the
kink points provides evidence in support of the validity of the RKD design. The
R-squared increases sharply as one moves closer to the actual kink point and then
decreases sharply, supportive of the existence of a kink around 0. The kink point
that maximizes the R-squared is situated $200 to the right of the real kink point,
but one cannot reject the hypothesis that the kink point is actually at 0. I in-
terpret these results as strong evidence in support of the validity of the RK design.
47I again group all unemployment spells for all periods together, and center the assignment variable
at the kink point applicable given the schedule in place at each particular time.
48I conduct here a simple grid search but these tests can become computationally burdensome when
looking for several breakpoints or for more complicated models, in which case the use of more efficient
algorithms is recommended, as in Bai and Perron [2003]
49This procedure increases the power of the test considerably.
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Figure A3. R-squared as a function of the location of the kink point in RKD specification
(10), Louisiana
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Notes: The graph shows the value of the R-squared as a function of the location of the kink point in
RKD specification (10). The assignment variable is centered at the actual kink point in the benefit
schedule so that virtual kink points are expressed relative to the real kink point in the schedule. Inspired
by non-parametric tests for the detection of structural breakpoints in time series analysis, I conduct a
grid search to look for the kink point that maximizes the R-squared. See text for details.
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6. Proportional hazard models
To get a sense of the validity of the RK design, it is useful to compare the RKD
estimates to the estimates of more standard empirical strategies widely used in the
existing literature. Most empirical studies on US data use proportional hazard
models. In table A4, I report the estimates of Cox proportional hazard mod-
els on the CWBH data which enables me to compare my results to the widely
cited benchmark of Meyer [1990], who used a smaller sample of the same CWBH
records.
This table estimates the effect of UI weekly benefits levels b on the hazard rate
of leaving UI using the CWBH complete data for the 5 US states . I fit standard
Cox proportional hazard models. All specifications include controls for gender,
ethnicity, marital status, year of schooling, a 6-pieces exhaustion spline and state
fixed effects. u denotes the state unemployment rate. log(b) denotes the log-
weekly UI benefit amount. p25 and p75 denote the 25th and 75th percentile of
unemployment rates (among all state×quarter in our data).
Coefficient estimates for log(b) in the proportional hazard models can be in-
terpreted as the elasticity of the hazard rate s with respect to the weekly benefit
level. Under the assumption that the hazard rate is somewhat constant, these
elasticities can be easily compared to the RKD elasticities of unemployment du-
ration, since D ≈ 1/s so that εD ≈ −εs.
Column (1) replicates the specification of Meyer [1990], Table VI, column (7).
Note that Meyer [1990] was using a much smaller sample of the same CWBH
records. The estimates show that the result of Meyer [1990], who found an elas-
ticity of .56, can be fully replicated using his specification. The drawback of these
estimates is that they do not fully address the endogeneity issue due to the joint
determination of UI benefits and previous earnings. Meyer [1990] only controls for
previous wages using the log of the base period earnings. Column (2) further adds
non-parametric controls for previous earnings and experience. Column (3) fur-
ther adds year×state fixed effects. Interestingly, if one adds this richer set of non
parametric controls for previous earnings to mitigate the concern of endogeneity,
and fully controls for variations across labor markets by adding time fixed effects
interacted with state fixed effects, the results converge to the RKD estimates and
the elasticity goes down to around .3. The reason is that, as one controls more
efficiently for the functional dependence between unemployment duration and
previous earnings, the only identifying variation in benefit level that is left comes
from the kink in the benefit schedule, and the model naturally converges to the
identification strategy of the RKD. Overall, I find this evidence to be supportive
of the validity of the RK design.
Columns (4) to (6) investigate the cyclicality of the partial equilibrium labor
supply elasticities in the standard proportional hazard model to analyze the ro-
bustness of the results of table A5. Columns (4) and (5) add the interaction of
log(UI) and high unemployment dummies (unemployment rate above the median
across all US states in the same quarter in column (4) and unemployment rate
above 8% in column (5)). Column (6) adds the interaction of log(b) with quartiles
for the level of unemployment (quartiles defined across all state×quarter cells in
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Table A4—Semi-Parametric Estimates of Hazard Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meyer [1990]
log(b) -0.587∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗
(0.0394) (0.0365) (0.0368) (0.0374) (0.0370)
State unemployment rate -0.0550∗∗∗ -0.0552∗∗∗ -0.0207 -0.0226 -0.0251 -0.105∗∗∗
(0.00518) (0.00519) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0153) (0.0209)
log(b)× (u>median) 0.0248∗∗
(0.00812)
log(b)×(u> .08) 0.00527
(0.00685)
log(b)×(u<p25) -0.363∗∗∗
(0.0376)
log(b)×(p25<u<median) -0.353∗∗∗
(0.0371)
log(b)×(median<u<p75) -0.292∗∗∗
(0.0371)
log(b)×(u>p75) -0.274∗∗∗
(0.0378)
Non-param controls for
previous wage & experience NO YES YES YES YES YES
Year×state F-E NO NO YES YES YES YES
# Spells 39852 39852 39852 39852 39852 39852
Log-likelihood -136305.0 -136364.8 -135976.0 -135971.4 -135975.7 -135946.2
This table estimates the effect of UI weekly benefits levels b on the hazard rate
of leaving UI using the CWBH complete data for 5 US states from the late
1970s to early 1980s. I fit Cox proportional hazard models. All specifications
include controls for gender, ethnicity, marital status, year of schooling, a 6-pieces
exhaustion spline and state fixed effects. u denotes the state unemployment
rate. log(b) denotes the log-weekly UI benefit amount. p25 and p75 denote
the 25th and 75th percentile of unemployment rates (among all state×quarter
in our data). Column (1) replicates the specification of Meyer [1990], Table VI,
column (7) (Meyer [1990] was using a much smaller dataset). Column (2) further
adds non-parametric controls for previous earnings. Column (3) further adds
year×state fixed effects. Columns (4) and (5) add the interaction of log(b) and
high unemployment dummies (unemployment rate above the median across all
US states in the same quarter in column (4) and unemployment rate above 8% in
column (5)). Column (6) adds the interaction of log(b) with quartiles for the level
of unemployment (quartiles defined across all state×quarter cells in our sample).
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7. Cyclical behavior:
Following the Great Recession, a recent literature has been interested in esti-
mating how labor supply responses to UI vary over the business cycle in order to
assess the optimality of UI rules that are contingent on the state of the labor mar-
ket (Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender [2012], Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011]).
I take advantage of the large variations in labor market conditions across states
and over time in the CWBH data to investigate how the RKD estimates vary
with indicators of (state) labor market conditions. I correlate the RKD estimates
with the average monthly unemployment rate from the Current Population Sur-
vey prevailing in the state for each period50. Results are displayed in table A5.
In all specifications, I weight the observations51 by the inverse of the standard
error (of the elasticity)52
Column (1) to (3) correlates the estimated elasticity with the unemployment
rate for all three duration outcomes. In all three columns, the coefficient on the
state unemployment rate is very small (around -.02 and not significantly different
from zero), which means that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate is associated with a .02 percentage point decrease in the estimated elastic-
ity. This result implies that elasticity varies between .38 (.09) when the state
unemployment rate is at 4.5% (minimum in the CWBH data) and .25 (.10) when
the unemployment rate is at 11.8% (the max in the CWBH data). This evidence
is in line with the evidence of Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] for the US, though
the cyclicality of the estimates is somewhat larger in their analysis. One needs
to acknowledge though that the standard errors on the estimated coefficient is
rather large and the result of this type of exercise should always be interpreted
with caution.
The estimates are not affected by the inclusion of state fixed effects as shown
in column (4). In column (5), I add more observations by estimating the RKD
model for subsets of the labor force in each state and sub-period. Here, I estimate
the RKD elasticity for young (below 40) and old (above 40 years old) workers sep-
arately, but one can think of other partitions of the labor market, as long as: 1)
unemployment rates can be computed for these sub-labor markets, 2) variation
in unemployment rate across these sub-labor markets is large enough, and 3)
each sub-labor market is large enough in order to estimate RKD elasticities with
enough precision. Adding several estimates within state and sub-periods has two
advantages. First, it increases the statistical power of the analysis, and more im-
portantly, it enables me to control for the level of the policy parameters at which
the elasticity is estimated. Each RKD elasticity is of course by nature endogenous
to the level of the maximum benefit amount and the potential duration at which
it is estimated, and these parameters vary for each state and sub-period. Results
in column (5) show that partitioning the data into a larger number of sub-labor
markets does not affect the result. The coefficient of the correlation between the
50To know to what extent variations in labor market conditions across states are a good proxy for
business cycle fluctuations is another question. I tend to prefer in table A5 specifications with state fixed
effects so that all variation in labor market conditions is variation over time, which mimics more clearly
the concept of business cycles.
51Each observation is a RKD elasticity estimate of unemployment duration with respect to the UI
benefit level for a state and sub period.
52Weighting reduces substantially the standard errors on the estimates of the correlation of the elas-
ticity with labor market conditions, without affecting the point estimates.
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unemployment rate in the sub-labor market and the RKD elasticity is still neg-
ative, and somewhat smaller in absolute value, though the amount of variation
over time in each sub-labor market when controlling for sub-labor market fixed
effects (here for age group fixed effects) is rather limited.
In table A4, columns (4) to (6) , I also investigate how the effect of the log
benefit correlates with state unemployment conditions in the standard Cox pro-
portional hazard model, and find similar results, with the estimated elasticity
decreasing slightly as the state unemployment rate increases.
Table A5—Cyclical Behavior of the RKD Estimates of the effect of benefit level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average Treatment Effects
εb εb εb εb εb
Initial Spell UI Paid UI Claimed Initial Spell
U -0.0195 -0.0293 -0.0259 -0.0289 -0.00576
(0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0239) (0.0303) (0.0445)
Kink (K$2010) -0.111
(0.170)
Potential Duration -0.00950
(0.0177)
State F-E × ×
Age Group F-E ×
Inverse s-e weights × × × × ×
N 26 26 26 26 52
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Each observation is a RKD estimate of the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the
UI benefit level for a state and sub period. Initial spell refers to the elasticity of the duration of the
initial unemployment spell as defined above. UI paid refers to the elasticity of the duration that UI is
paid, and UI claimed refers to the elasticity of the duration of the UI claim. U is the average monthly
state unemployment rate from CPS and in column (5) U is the average monthly state unemployment
rate from CPS for each age group (the young, below 40, and the older workers, above 40 years old).
Unemployment rates are expressed in percentage points, so that the results in column (1) for instance
should be interpreted as follows: a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated
with a .019 percentage point decrease in the estimated elasticity.
8. Test for the slackness of the liquidity constraint
The result of proposition 1 relies on the assumption that the liquidity constraint
is not yet binding at the exhaustion point B. I begin by providing a simple test
for this assumption. The intuition for the test is simple. If the liquidity constraint
is binding, it means that the unemployed can no longer deplete their asset; they
are hand-to-mouth, and therefore, benefits that they have received in the past do
not have any effect on their future behavior. If to the contrary, exit rates after
the exhaustion point are affected by benefits received before exhaustion, it means
that agents can still transfer part of their consumption across time periods.
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Formally, if the Euler equation is satisfied, one can express the effect of benefit
in period 0 on effort in period 1 using (4):
∂s1
∂b0
=
u′′(cu0)
β(u′(ce1)− u′(cu1))
≤ 0
∂s1
∂b0
is inversely proportional to the liquidity effect. In other words, when the
Euler equation holds and agents can transfer money freely across periods, an
increase in benefits earlier during the spell reduces the probability of exiting
unemployment because it increases asset level. But when the agents can no
longer smooth consumption perfectly or have little asset to transfer across periods,
the denominator (which is directly proportional to the consumption smoothing
benefits of UI) increases and ∂s1∂b0 tends to be small in absolute value. When agents
hit the borrowing constraint, they become hand-to-mouth and set consumption
equal to income every period, in which case the Euler equation does not hold any
more and ∂s1∂b0 = 0.
The implementation of the test relies on estimation of
∂sB+1
∂bB
, the effect of re-
ceiving extra benefits at time B on exit rates after benefit exhaustion at time
B+ 1. To identify
∂sB+1
∂bB
, the idea is to compare the exit rates conditional on still
being unemployed after the maximum exhaustion point of two individuals, one
having been given exogenously one more week of covered UI than the other. Once
again, the RK design can be used to implement the test53, taking advantage of
the kink in the schedule of the potential duration of benefits, which creates vari-
ations in the number of weeks that individuals can collect UI before time B, or
equivalently in the total amount of benefits that individuals can collect before
time B. I run regressions of the form of equation (10) where the outcome is
the probability of exiting unemployment between 40 and 60 weeks54, conditional
on still being unemployed after 39 weeks (the maximum duration of benefits in
Washington between July 1980 and July 1981). The assignment variable is the
ratio of base period earnings to highest quarter of earnings, that determines the
potential duration of UI. The RKD identifies55 ∂sB+1/∂B that I then divide by
the benefit amount b to get
∂sB+1
∂bB
56.
Results are reported in column (1) of table A5. Having received one extra
dollar of benefits before 39 weeks reduces the exit rate out of unemployment after
exhaustion by a statistically significant .19 percentage point. This means that
benefits received before the exhaustion point still have a negative effect on exit
53The advantage of the RKD setting is that it can easily be extended to the estimation of the effect
of unemployment benefits on the hazard rate at different points of the hazard support as explained in
appendix A.2.
54Because of the small number of observations, I am forced to choose a rather large interval to increase
the precision of the estimates.
55As explained in appendix A.2, when dealing with hazard rates, identification requires some assump-
tions regarding the selection process in case some unobserved heterogeneity θ also determines the exit
rate out of unemployment st({bt}Bt=0, θ). Under the assumption that the heterogeneity effect is additively
separable, in which case ∂
2sB
∂bB∂θ
= 0, then
u′′(cuB)
u′(cu
B+1
)−v′(ce
B+1
)
is point identified. I ran tests of smoothness
of the relationship between observable covariates at the kink and the assignment variable conditional on
still being unemployed after 39 weeks, and could not detect significant changes in slope, indicative of the
validity of the identifying assumption.
56I assume here that a marginal change in the potential duration of benefits B normalized by the benefit
amount b is the same as a marginal change in bB . This would be the case if B could be increased by a
fraction of period. This simplification does not affect the validity of the test but only the interpretation
of the coefficient in column (1) of table A5.
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rates after the exhaustion point, or in other words, that the liquidity constraint
is not yet binding at the exhaustion point. Note that per se, this statistics is
interesting in the sense that it is inversely related to the consumption smoothing
benefits of UI at the exhaustion point. The lower this statistics, the larger the
liquidity effect of UI benefits at exhaustion. It would therefore be interesting to
be able to replicate this type of test to look at the evolution of this statistics over
the business cycle. I also provide some quantile regression analysis in appendix
A.9 showing that this test does not seem to be contaminated by heterogeneity.
Table A5—RKD estimates of behavioral responses to UI, tests for the slackness of the liquidity constraint, and liquidity effect estimates, Washington, Jul
1980 - Jul 1981
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test for slackness Effect Effect Liquidity and moral
of the liquidity constraint of benefit level of potential duration hazard estimates
∂sB+1
∂bB
-.0019
(.00082)
[.337]
εDB .730 1.348
(.110) (.685)
[.814] [.388]
εD .291 .330
(.071) (.425)
[.392] [.474]
( 1B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣
B
− 1b ∂s0∂B )× 103 -.042
(.01)
Moral Hazard: .0014
Θ1 (.0001)
Liquidity to Moral Hazard: .876
ρ1 (.022)
N 529 6061 2049 9471
Notes: For all columns, standard errors for the estimates are in parentheses. P-values are reported between brackets and are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of
bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. Results are obtained from a linear specification. The bandwidth for the RK
estimate of benefit level is 2500 (assignment variable: highest quarter of earnings) and .75 for the RK estimate of the potential duration (assignment variable: ratio of base period
to highest quarter of earnings). This table shows how to use the RKD to estimate all the statistics needed to calibrate the welfare effects of UI. Column (1) begins by testing
for the slackness of the liquidity constraint. It reports the RK estimate of b · ∂s
∂bB
, the effect of one additional dollar of UI before 39 weeks on the exit rate of unemployment
after exhaustion, between 40 weeks and 60 weeks. The estimates suggest that the Euler equation holds and that variations in benefits prior to exhaustion affect exit rate of
unemployment after the exhaustion point. Column (2) reports the RKD estimate of the elasticity of UI duration (εDB
) and of the elasticity of non-employment duration (εD)
with respect to benefit level. Column (3) reports the RKD estimate of the same elasticities with respect to potential duration. Column (4) reports the liquidity and moral hazard
effect estimates following the strategy detailed in proposition 1. ( 1
B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
− 1
b
∂s0
∂B
) is the difference between the RKD estimate of the effect of benefit level (divided by the
potential duration) and the RKD estimate of the effect of potential duration (divided by the benefit level) on s0 defined as the exit rate out of unemployment in the first 4 weeks
of unemployment. To ensure that the characteristics of individuals at both kinks (in benefit level and potential duration) are the same, I use a reweighing approach described in
appendix B. Following proposition 1, this difference is then used to compute the moral hazard effect Θ1 of an increase in benefit level and the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard
ρ1 in the effect of an increase in benefit level. For the three statistics of column (4), bootstrapped s.e. with 50 replications are in parentheses. See text for additional details.
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9. Heterogeneity in the test for slackness of the credit constraint at benefit exhaustion
One potential concern with the test for the slackness of the liquidity constraint
presented in section 4 of the paper is that the average effect, which shows that
on average the liquidity constraint is not yet binding at benefit exhaustion, is
contaminated by heterogeneity. In particular, it may be that some individuals
hit the credit constraint, and for them,
∂sB+1
∂bB
= 0. To investigate the extent
of heterogeneity in the estimate, I estimate quantile treatment effects of the ef-
fect of past benefits on DB+1, the duration of non-employment after 39 weeks
(conditional on being unemployed after 39 weeks). In case of a large degree of
heterogeneity, (some people being extremely credit constrained, and some other
being less credit constrained), we would expect these quantile treatment effects
to be very different: because the amount of your credit constraint is directly cor-
related with your exit rate after exhaustion (the less asset you have, the harder
your search effort), the lower quantile of the distribution of DB+1 should react
much less (or even not at all) to a change in prior benefits. Results, reported
in table A6 show that even though lower quantile of the distribution do react a
little less to a change in benefits before 39 weeks, differences across quantiles are
small and not statistically significant. This evidence is supportive of the fact that
the credit constrained is not firmly binding at benefit exhaustion. Almost every-
body maintains some ability to transfer money across periods at time benefits are
exhausted (albeit certainly at different costs).
Table A6—Heterogeneous effects in the test for slackness of the credit constraint at ex-
haustion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile Treatment Effects
q=.1 q=.25 q=.5 q=.75 q=.9
∂DB+1
∂bB
.109 .194 .545 .220 .256
(.068) (.091) (.200) (.170) (.172)
p-value .231 .475 .365 .521 .198
Optimal poly. 1 1 1 1 1
N 529 529 529 529 529
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
10. Construction of weights for the reweighted approach estimation in liquidity effects
and moral hazard estimates
To make sure that our comparison of the effect of benefit level and potential
duration using the two deterministic and kinked benefit schedules is not mixing
heterogenous individuals, we re-weight the observations in the sample for the
RKD estimates of ∂s0db
∣∣∣
B
(sample 1) to match the distribution of observable char-
acteristics of observations in the sample for the RKD estimates of ∂s0dB (sample 2).
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To generate these weights, for each period, I merge observations from both sam-
ples. I then estimate a probit model of the probability that a given observation
in this merged sample belongs to sample 1. The predictors in this regression are
gender, age, age squared, education in years, and dummies for 5 main industries.
Using predicted propensity score p, I then weight each observation in the RKD
regressions with the weight ω = p/(1− p)
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B. RKD Figures & Results for all 5 states
Figure B1. Unemployment Rates in CWBH states 1976-1984
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Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the monthly unemployment rate in the 5 states with
the universe of unemployment spells available from the CWBH data. The CWBH data for
the 5 states covers period of low unemployment as well as the two recessions of 1980 and
1981-82 with two-digit national unemployment rates, which gives the opportunity to examine
the evolution of behavioral responses to UI over the business cycle.
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Figure B2. RKD evidence of the Effect of Benefit Level: Duration UI Paid vs Highest Quar-
ter Earnings for All 5 States
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Notes: The graph shows for the first sub-period of analysis in each state the mean values of the duration
of paid UI in each bin of $250 of highest quarter of earnings, which is the assignment variable in the RK
design for the estimation of the effect of benefit level. The assignment variable is centered at the kink.
The graph shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome at the kink. Formal estimates of
the kink using polynomial regressions of the form of equation 10 are displayed in table 2. The red lines
display predicted values of the regressions in the linear case allowing for a discontinuous shift at the kink.
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Figure B3. RKD evidence of the Effect of Benefit Level: Duration of Initial Unemployment
Spell vs Highest Quarter Earnings for All 5 States
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Notes: The graph shows for the first sub-period of analysis in each state the mean values of the duration
of initial spell in each bin of $250 of highest quarter of earnings, which is the assignment variable in the
RK design for the estimation of the effect of benefit level. The assignment variable is centered at the
kink. The graph shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome at the kink. Formal estimates
of the kink using polynomial regressions of the form of equation 10 are displayed in table 2. The red
lines display predicted values of the regressions in the linear case allowing for a discontinuous shift at
the kink.
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Strategic timing of UI claims
If individuals can perfectly anticipate when the maximum benefit amount is in-
creased, this may lead to strategic behaviors in terms of the timing of UI claims.
To investigate the extent of strategic manipulation of the timing of claims, I look
at the distribution of claims by dates (in weeks) centered at the time when the
maximum benefit is increased (week 0). I pool all maximum benefit increases
together to maximize power. The sample is restricted to individuals who have
highest quarter earnings above the kink of the initial schedule (prior to the benefit
increase) so that all individuals in the sample would benefit from the increase in
the maximum benefit if they claimed after week 0. In the presence of strategic
manipulation, we would expect the presence of bunching just after week 0, and
a hole in the distribution just before week 0. In practice, no evidence of manipu-
lation can be detected in the distribution of claiming dates, as can be seen from
Figure B4 which shows the distribution of claiming dates centered at the time
the maximum benefit amount is increased for Louisiana. This evidence greatly
alleviates the concern that strategic timing of claims may affect our empirical
setting.
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Figure B4. Distribution of claiming dates, centered at the time the maximum benefit amount
is increased, Louisiana
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Notes: The figure investigates the extent of strategic manipulation of the timing of claims that may
arise if individuals can perfectly anticipate when the maximum benefit amount is increased. The figure
displays the distribution of claims by dates (in weeks) centered at the time when the maximum benefit
is increased (week 0). I pool all maximum benefit increases together to maximize power. The sample is
restricted to individuals who have highest quarter earnings above the kink of the initial schedule (prior
to the benefit increase) so that all individuals in the sample would benefit from the increase in the
maximum benefit if they claimed after week 0. In the presence of strategic manipulation, we would
expect the presence of bunching just after week 0, and a hole in the distribution just before week 0. In
practice, no evidence of manipulation can be detected in the distribution of claiming dates. This evidence
greatly alleviates the concern that strategic timing of claims may affect our empirical setting.
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Table B2— RKD Estimates, effect of benefit level, Idaho, 1976 - 1983
(1) (2) (3)
Duration of Duration Duration
Initial Spell UI Claimed UI Paid
Period 1: jan1976 to jul1978
α .037 .037 .043
(.009) (.008) (.009)
εb .337 .386 .334
(.086) (.086) (.072)
p-value .022 .007 .003
N 7487 7487 7487
Period 2: jul1978 to jul1980
α .087 .079 .09
(.009) (.008) (.009)
εb .756 .815 .698
(.079) (.084) (.07)
p-value .035 .02 .099
N 8143 8143 8143
Period 3: jul1980 to jul1981
α .065 .038 .057
(.016) (.014) (.016)
εb .58 .392 .445
(.144) (.141) (.125)
p-value .602 .277 .38
N 3596 3596 3596
Period 4: jul1981 to jun1982
α .006 .005 -.002
(.02) (.016) (.018)
εb .053 .048 -.015
(.143) (.144) (.122)
p-value .443 .57 .273
N 3968 3968 3968
Period 5: jun1982 to dec1983
α .047 .048 .045
(.022) (.02) (.022)
εb .381 .466 .319
(.182) (.195) (.16)
p-value .121 .275 .062
N 2245 2245 2245
Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. α is the RK estimate
of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard
errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test
of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin
dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The
optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake
Information Criterion. Periods correspond to stable UI benefit schedules.
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Table B3— RKD Estimates, effect of benefit level, Missouri Jan 1978 - Dec 1983
(1) (2) (3)
Duration of Duration Duration
Initial Spell UI Claimed UI Paid
Period 1: jan1978 to dec1979
α .02 .02 .031
(.009) (.01) (.01)
εb .164 .165 .196
(.075) (.08) (.064)
p-value .131 .479 .259
N 6071 6071 6071
Period 2: dec1979 to dec1980
α .031 .026 .044
(.012) (.013) (.013)
εb .226 .179 .24
(.089) (.087) (.073)
p-value .49 .346 .077
N 5500 5500 5500
Period 3: jan1981 to jan1982
α .01 .005 .02
(.012) (.012) (.013)
εb .084 .043 .13
(.102) (.102) (.084)
p-value .877 .843 .942
N 3625 3625 3625
Period 4: jan1982 to aug1982
α .033 .034 .049
(.016) (.017) (.018)
εb .232 .239 .277
(.117) (.119) (.102)
p-value .174 .091 .006
N 2550 2550 2550
Period 5: aug1982 to dec1983
α .052 .043 .061
(.011) (.012) (.012)
εb .376 .317 .364
(.082) (.085) (.07)
p-value .489 .529 .597
N 5036 5036 5036
Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. α is the RK estimate
of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard
errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test
of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin
dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The
optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake
Information Criterion. Periods correspond to stable UI benefit schedules.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 71
Table B4— RKD Estimates, effect of benefit level, New Mexico 1980 - 1983
(1) (2) (3)
Duration of Duration Duration
Initial Spell UI Claimed UI Paid
Period 1: apr1980 to jan1981
α .051 .046 .055
(.019) (.019) (.018)
εb .353 .332 .34
(.129) (.135) (.114)
p-value .20 .24 .18
2851 2851 2851
Period 2: jan1981 to jan1982
α .033 .026 .031
(.012) (.013) (.012)
εb .316 .272 .262
(.118) (.129) (.105)
p-value .3 .29 .37
4906 4906 4906
Period 3: jan1982 to jan1983
α .041 .023 .037
(.016) (.017) (.016)
εb .342 .202 .273
(.137) (.147) (.122)
p-value .9 .783 .647
3905 3905 3905
Period 4: jan1983 to dec1983
α .04 .03 .04
(.015) (.015) (.015)
εb .382 .297 .335
(.14) (.149) (.123)
p-value .391 .389 .375
4209 4209 4209
Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. α is the RK estimate
of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard
errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test
of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin
dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The
optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake
Information Criterion. Periods correspond to stable UI benefit schedules.
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Table B5—Baseline RKD Estimates, effect of benefit level on Unemployment and Non-
Employment Duration, Washington 1979 - 1983
Duration
Initial Spell
Duration
UI Claimed
Duration
UI Paid
Non-Employment
Duration
Period 1: July 1979- July 1980
α .085 .078 .087 .088
(.018) (.017) (.018) (.022)
εb .68 .69 .657 .419
(.147) (.152) (.136) (.104)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1 1
p-value .162 .197 .198 .327
N 3485 3485 3485 3485
Period 2: July 1980- July 1982
α .07 .059 .077 .056
(.017) (.016) (.017) (.02)
εb .583 .546 .591 .278
(.138) (.146) (.128) (.097)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1 1
p-value .987 .991 .985 .968
N 3601 3601 3601 3601
Period 3: July 1982- Dec 1983
α .054 .035 .055 .059
(.021) (.02) (.021) (.022)
εb .37 .263 .351 .281
(.146) (.153) (.137) (.105)
Opt. Poly 1 1 1 1
p-value .022 .036 .009 .183
N 4275 4275 4275 4275
Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. Washington is the only state for which we observe
reemployment dates from wage records in the CWBH data. I therefore constructed a variable for the
total duration of non-employment in Washington, and display in column (4) the estimates of the effect
of benefit level on this duration outcome as well. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of
the UI benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values
are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are
added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based on
the minimization of the Aikake Information Criterion. Periods correspond to stable UI benefit schedules.
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C. Proofs and Results
1. Understanding the comparison with a simple dynamic labor supply model with no
state dependence:
Here, I briefly present a very simple two-period model with no state dependence,
to understand how one can relate a dynamic search model to this general class
of models. I also show how the Frisch elasticity literature uses variations along
the wage profile over time to identify distortionary effects and liquidity effects
separately, and how this relates to the technique employed in this paper to identify
moral hazard effects and liquidity effects. Imagine a simple two-period model
where utility in each period is given by Ut = u(ct)−ψ(st) where st is some effort
level that brings a monetary reward (wage) rt. ψ(.) is increasing and convex.
Agents start with some asset level A0. The individual’s program is therefore:
maxc0,c1,s0,s1 U0 + U1 s.t. r0s0 + r1s1 + A0 ≥ c0 + c1 The first order conditions
give us: 
ψ′(s0) = λr0
ψ′(s1) = λr1
u′(c0) = λ
u′(c1) = λ
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier, or in other words, the marginal utility of
wealth. Combining these first order conditions we get the Euler equation giving
the optimal inter temporal allocation:
u′(c0)
u′(c1)
= 1
And the static intratemporal optimal allocation rule:
ψ′(s0) = r0u′(c0)
From this, we immediately see that the response to a change in the return to
effort at time 0 is the sum of a liquidity effect and of a distortionary effect:
∂s0
∂r0
=
−λ− r0 ∂λ∂r0
ψ′′(s0)
=
−u′(c0)
ψ′′(s0)
− r0u
′′(c0)
ψ′′(s0)
This decomposition is exactly the same as the one in Chetty [2008], and is at the
centre of the dynamic labor supply literature: The first-term is the Frisch effect,
keeping marginal utility of consumption constant. The second one is a liquidity
effect because we alter the marginal utility of consumption: − r0u′′(c0)ψ′′(s0) =
∂s0
∂A0
. Here
of course, the return to effort is continuous (r), but it is easy to see from a simple
Taylor expansion that it is equivalent to the liquidity effect (−u′(ce)−u′(cu)ψ′′(s0) =
∂s0
∂A0
)
that we have in Chetty [2008] in the case of the return to job search effort.
The important insight from extending this simple example to a multi period
case is that, in the absence of state-dependence as is the case here, effort at time
t is always a function of wage at time t and all other wages affect current effort
only through λ, because of the optimal inter temporal allocation rule. So that we
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have st = st(rt, λt) where λt = λt(r0, ..., rN , A0).
From this, there are two possible routes to identify the Frisch effect of a change
in the wage rate. The first route, as in MaCurdy [1981] is to impose some structure
on the problem by specifying the utility function so as to obtain a nice log-linear
form for the Frisch effort function of individual i : ln(sit) = βlnr
i
t + αlnλ
i
t and
under some assumptions, the marginal utility of consumption can be written as
an individual fixed effect and a time effect lnλit = γi+et. Then, the model can be
identified in first-difference using panel data and variations along the wage profile:
∆ln(sit) = β∆lnr
i
t + ∆et. The difficulty is to find credibly exogenous variations
in the wage profile.
The second route is to use more credibly exogenous variations, and use reduced
form estimates of the effect of a change in the wage at different point in times.
This is the route chosen in this paper. The idea is that we have: ∂s0∂r0 =
−λ−r0 ∂λ∂r0
ψ′′(s0)
∂s0
∂r1
=
−r0 ∂λ∂r1
ψ′′(s0)
And we also know that ∂λ∂r1 =
∂λ
∂r0
. The difference in the reduced form estimates of
the effect of a change in wages at time 0 and 1 can identify the Frisch effect −λψ′′(s0)
keeping marginal utility of wealth constant. This technique has the advantage
that the identifying variations are more transparent, but relies on the exact same
idea of using variations along the wage profile over time. In this paper, the only
complication comes from the presence of state dependence, as explained in section
1.
2. Multi-period model:
Here, I present the multi-period model extension of the simple model presented
in section 1 of the paper and derive the main results. The model describes the
behavior of a worker living T discrete periods (e.g., weeks) who is laid-off and
therefore becomes unemployed in period zero. When unemployed, the worker
exerts search effort in each period st that translates into a probability to find a
job57. This probability is normalized to st to simplify presentation. Search effort
is not observable (hence the presence of moral hazard) and has a utility cost ψ(st)
increasing and convex. Wages wt are exogenous
58, and when an unemployed finds
a job, it lasts forever. When unemployed, an agent starts her unemployment spell
with asset level A0 and receives unemployment insurance benefits bt each period.
As a baseline, I consider that the initial asset level A0 is exogenous and do not
allow for heterogeneity. Both assumptions can be relaxed, as I show in extensions
of the model below. To finance the unemployment benefits, the government levies
a lump sum tax τ on each employed worker.
57This captures the presence of search frictions in the labor market.
58Empirical evidence seems to support this assumption that wages in fact do not respond much to
UI. There is a vast empirical micro literature in labor trying to estimate how re-employment wages are
affected by the generosity of UI benefits. The striking finding is that it has proven impossible to find such
an effect. Card, Chetty and Weber [2007] use full population administrative payroll data from Austria in
a compelling regression discontinuity design and find no effects (very precisely estimated) on subsequent
re-employment wages. Wages of workers who are already on the job are even less likely to respond to
a change in benefits than wages of workers who are coming from unemployment and negotiating with
employers. So wages of existing workers are likely to respond less than wages of new hires to UI generosity.
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The planner sets taxes τ and benefits b to maximize welfare W0 (defined as
the expected life-time utility of an unemployed worker), under a balanced-budget
constraint: DB · b = (T −D)τ where DB is the duration of paid unemployment
and D is the total duration of unemployment. I restrict attention here to the
class of typical UI systems where benefits are defined by a constant level b for
a fixed period B59. Therefore choosing the optimal benefit schedule amounts to
choosing potential duration B and benefit level b.
Timing of the model: Individuals enter unemployment at period t = 0. At
the beginning of every period, if the individual is still unemployed, she chooses
search effort. Once search effort is realized, she chooses consumption. The value
function of finding a job at time t is:
V (At) = max
At+1≥L
u(At −At+1 + wt − τ) + βV (At+1)
The value function of being unemployed at time t is:
U(At) = max
At+1≥L
u(At −At+1 + bt) + βJ(At+1)
J(At) = max
st
st · V (At) + (1− st) · U(At)− ψ(st)
s.t.
u(cut ) ≥ 0
u(cet ) ≥ 0
We assume that ψ(.) is increasing and convex.
For simplicity, and following Chetty [2008] who shows that in simulations U is
always concave, we assume U is always concave.
Definition and notations: We define the effect on any variable Z of a change
in the constant benefit level b for a finite period of potential duration of UI benefits
B as:
∂Z
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
=
B−1∑
i=0
∂Z
∂bi
We also define a series of search and duration measures in the following way:
• fk(t) =
∏t−1
i=k(1− si)st is the probability that the unemployment spell lasts
exactly t periods conditional on being still unemployed at the beginning of
period k.
• Sk(t) =
∏t
i=k(1− si) is the survival rate at time t conditional on being still
unemployed at period k.
• Fk(t) =
∑t
s=k f(s) = 1 − Sk(t) is the probability that the length of a spell
is inferior or equal to t conditional on being still unemployed at period k.
• DTk =
∑T
i=0 Sk(i) is the average duration of a spell truncated at T periods
conditional on being still unemployed after k periods.
59A large theoretical literature has derived the full optimal time-path of UI benefits. See for instance
Hopenhayn and Nicolini [1997], or ?.
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Optimal search effort at time t is given by the following first-order condition:
(13) ψ′(st) = V (At)− U(At)
Euler equations:
∀t u′(cet ) =
{
βu′(cet+1)
u′(w − τ) if At = L
∀t u′(cut ) =
{
β[st+1u
′(cet+1) + (1− st+1)u′(cut+1)]
u′(bt) if At = L
Therefore, if the credit constraint is not binding at time t we have that:
∀t u′(ce0) = βtu′(cet )(14)
∀t u′(cu0) =
t∑
j=1
(
j−1∏
i=1
(1− si)sj)βju′(cej) + βt
t∏
i=1
(1− si)u′(cut )
= F1(t)u
′(ce0) + β
tS1(t)u
′(cut )(15)
Moral hazard and liquidity effects:
Using the first order condition for search effort given in equation 13 we get the
effect of benefit level at time t on optimal search:
∂st
∂bt
= − u
′(cut )
ψ′′(st)
and more generally the effect of benefit level at time t + j on optimal search at
time t:
(16)
∂st
∂bt+j
= −β
j
∏j
i=1(1− st+i)u′(cut+j)
ψ′′(st)
= −St+1(t+ j)β
ju′(cut+j)
ψ′′(st)
From 13, we also have that:
∂st
∂At
=
u′(cet )− u′(cut )
ψ′′(st)
∂st
∂wt
=
u′(cet )
ψ′′(st)
so that:
(17)
∂st
∂bt
=
liquidity effect︷︸︸︷
∂st
∂At
− ∂st
∂wt︸︷︷︸
moral hazard effect
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which is the Chetty (2007) decomposition of the effect of benefits between the
liquidity and moral hazard effect.
The first term is a liquidity effect that is proportional to the difference in marginal
utility of consumption while employed and unemployed. The second term is the
standard moral hazard effect that arises because bt works as an unemployment
subsidy, and distorts the relative price of employment. Since
Similarly, the effect on search effort at time 0 of a change in the constant benefit
level b for a finite period of potential duration of UI benefits B can also be written
as the sum of two components, a moral hazard and a liquidity effect:
(18)
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
=
liquidity effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂s0
∂A
∣∣∣∣
B
− ∂s0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B︸ ︷︷ ︸
moral hazard effect
where ∂s0∂A
∣∣∣
B
=
∑B−1
i=0
∂s0
∂Ai
is the effect of a change in the level of an annuity
that pays $a every period and ∂s0∂w
∣∣∣
B
=
∑B−1
i=0
∂s0
∂wi
3. Proof of proposition 1:
I now show how ∂s0∂w
∣∣∣
B
, the moral hazard effect on search effort at time 0 of
a change in the constant benefit level b for a finite period of potential duration
of UI benefits B can be identified using variations in search effort at time 0 in
response to a change in benefit level ∂s0∂b
∣∣∣
B
and variations in search effort at time
0 in response to a change in benefit duration ∂s0∂B .
This proof is a simple generalization in a multi-period model of the proof given
in the two-period model in the main text of this paper.
Using the first order condition for search effort given in equation 13 we get the
effect of a change in wage at time t on optimal search at time 0:
∂s0
∂wt
=
∂V (A0)
∂wt
− ∂U(A0)∂wt
ψ′′(s0)
After some algebra, we have that:
∂V (A0)
∂wt
= βtu′(cet )
∂U(A0)
∂wt
= F1(t)β
tu′(cet )
so that, using the Euler equations, we have that:
(19)
∂s0
∂wt
=
(1− F1(t))βtu′(cet )
ψ′′(s0)
=
S1(t)u
′(ce0)
ψ′′(s0)
= S1(t)
∂s0
∂w0
Equation 19 generalizes equation 5 from the two period model, and gives the
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relationship between the effect on effort at time 0 of a change in wage at time t
and the effect on effort at time 0 of a change in wage at time 0. This relationship
stems from the presence of state dependence. In the absence of state dependence,
as is usually the case in the standard dynamic labor supply literature, S1(t) = 0
and therefore there is no moral hazard effect of changing benefits in time t on
current effort at time 0: all the effect of changing the wage rate at time t on effort
at time 0 happens through the liquidity effect (the change in the marginal utility
of wealth). The intuition is that S1(t) = 0 means that no matter what my effort
at time 0 is, I will be employed at time t with certainty, therefore changing the
wage rate at time t has no forward-looking effect on my effort at time 0. The
higher the probability that I remain unemployed at time t, the larger the forward
looking effect of changing the wage rate at time t on my effort at time 0.
Using equation 19, we can now rewrite the moral hazard effect of an increase
in benefit level b for B periods that we call Θ1:
(20) Θ1 =
∂s0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
=
B−1∑
t=0
∂s0
∂wt
=
∂s0
∂w0
·
B−1∑
t=0
S1(t)
Using equation 16 and the Euler equations, the effect of an increase in benefit
level at time t on exit rate at time 0 can be written:
∂s0
∂bt
= −S1(t)β
tu′(cut )
ψ′′(s0)
=
F1(t)u
′(ce0)− u′(cu0)
ψ′′(s0)
=
(1− S1(t))u′(ce0)− u′(cu0)
ψ′′(s0)
=
∂s0
∂A0
− S1(t) ∂s0
∂w0
(21)
Equation 21 generalizes equation 6 from the two period model. Equation 21
stems from the presence of state dependence and has the same intuition as equa-
tion 19 above. In the absence of state dependence, as is usually the case in the
standard dynamic labor supply literature, S1(t) = 0 all the effect of changing the
wage rate at time t on effort at time 0 happens through the liquidity effect (the
change in the marginal utility of wealth). But with state dependence, changing
benefits at time t has a negative forward-looking moral hazard effect on effort at
time 0 on top of the mere liquidity effect. The higher the probability S1(t) that I
remain unemployed at time t, the larger the forward looking effect of of increasing
benefits at time t on my effort at time 0.
Using equation 21, we can write the effect of an increase of benefit level b for
B periods as:
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∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
=
B−1∑
t=0
∂s0
∂bt
= B · ∂s0
∂A0
− ∂s0
∂w0
·
B−1∑
t=0
S1(t)(22)
Using equation 21, we can also write the effect of an increase in benefit duration
B periods keeping constant benefit level b:
∂s0
∂B
≈ b · ∂s0
∂bB
= b ·
{ ∂s0
∂A0
− ∂s0
∂w0
· S1(B)
}
(23)
From 22 and 23, it follows that:
1
B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
− 1
b
∂s0
∂B
= −
(B−1∑
t=0
S1(t)
B
− S1(B)
) ∂s0
∂w0
= −
(
SB1 − S1(B)
) ∂s0
∂w0
(24)
where SB1 is the average survival rate between time 1 and time B−1 conditional
on being unemployed at time 1. Proposition 1 follows from using 20 and 24:
(25)
1
B
∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
− 1
b
∂s0
∂B
= −S
B
1 − S1(B)
DB1
· Θ1
4. Optimal benefit level b:
Planner’s problem: the government cannot observe effort and cannot con-
tract directly on st, any increase in bt leads to a decline in search effort. The plan-
ner sets taxes τ and benefits bt to maximize welfare W0 (defined as the expected
life-time utility of an unemployed worker), under a balanced-budget constraint:
DB · b = (T −D)τ where DB is the duration of paid unemployment and D is the
total duration of unemployment. I restrict attention here to the class of typical
UI systems where benefits are defined by a constant level b for a fixed period B60.
Therefore choosing the optimal benefit schedule amounts to choosing potential
duration B and benefit level b.
The social planner chooses the UI benefit level to maximize expected utility
subject to a balanced-budget constraint and given a potential duration of benefits
B:
60A large theoretical literature has derived the full optimal time-path of UI benefits. See for instance
Hopenhayn and Nicolini [1997], or ?.
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max
b,τ
W0 = (1− s0)U(A0) + s0V (A0)− ψ(s0)
subject to DB · b = (T −D)τ
The first order condition is given by:
dW0
db
= (1− s0)
[ ∂U0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
− ∂U0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
dτ
db
]
+ s0
[ ∂V0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
− ∂V0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
dτ
db
]
= 0
From 13, we have that:
∀y, ∂s0
∂y
∣∣∣∣
B
=
1
ψ′′(s0)
[ ∂V0
∂y
∣∣∣∣
B
− ∂U0
∂y
∣∣∣∣
B
]
So that:
(26)
dW0
db
= −(1− s0)ψ′′(s0) ∂s0
∂b
∣∣∣∣
B
− dτ
db
(
(1− s0) ∂U0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
+ s0
∂V0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
)
We also know that: ∀t, ∂V0∂wt = βtu′(cet ) so that :
∂V0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
=
B−1∑
t=0
βtu′(cet )
= Bu′(ce0) if the credit constraint does not bind at time B(27)
And, similarly: ∀t, ∂U0∂wt =
∑t
j=1 f1(j)β
tu′(cet ) so that :
∂U0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
=
B−1∑
t=1
F1(t)β
tu′(cet )
=
B−1∑
t=1
F1(t)u
′(ce0) if the credit constraint does not bind at time B(28)
And therefore, if the credit constraint does not bind at time B
(1− s0) ∂U0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
=
B−1∑
t=1
(1− s0)F1(t)u′(ce0)
=
B−1∑
t=1
F0(t)u
′(ce0)
= (B −DB − s0)u′(ce0)(29)
where we use the fact that
∑B−1
t=0 S(t) = DB, the average duration of unemploy-
ment truncated at B.
Note that the moral hazard effect of an increase in b can also be expressed as
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a simple function of u′(ce0) if the credit constraint is not binding at time B:
∂s0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
=
1
ψ′′(s0)
[ ∂V0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
− ∂U0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
]
=
(DB − s0(B − 1))u′(ce0)
(1− s0) · ψ′′(s0)(30)
Using (18), (27), (29) and (30), we can rewrite (26) such that:
dW0
db
= −(1−s0)ψ′′(s0)
[( ∂s0
∂a
∣∣∣∣
B
− ∂s0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
)
+
dτ
db
( ∂s0
∂w
∣∣∣∣
B
·(B/(DB−s0(B−1))−1)
)]
We get from the government budget constraint that:
dτ
db
=
DB
T −D (1 + εDB + εD
D
T −D )
where εDB =
b
DB
dDB
db is the elasticity of the duration of paid unemployment with
respect to the benefit level and εD =
b
D
dD
db is the elasticity of the duration of total
unemployment with respect to the benefit level.
Therefore, if the credit constraint is not yet binding at time B, the first-order
condition dW0db = 0 takes a simple form:
(31) 1 + ρ1 = (
B
DB − s0(B − 1) − 1)
DB
T −D (1 + εDB + εD
D
T −D )
where ρ1 = −
∂s0
∂a
∣∣∣
B
∂s0
∂w
∣∣∣
B
is the liquidity to moral hazard ratio in the effect of an in-
crease of benefit level. When the lefthand side of 31 is superior to the righthand
side, it is socially desirable to increase the benefit level b, at the given level of
potential duration B.
5. Optimal potential duration B:
To analyze marginal changes in B, I assume that a marginal change in the
potential duration of benefits B normalized by the benefit amount b is therefore
the same as a marginal change in bB
61. In this context, following the same logic
as previously, we have that :
dW0
dB
= b.
dW0
dbB
= b.
(
−(1−s0)ψ′′(s0)
[( ∂s0
∂aB
− ∂s0
∂wB
)
+
dτ
db
( ∂s0
∂wB
·(1/(S(B)−s0)−1)
)])
61This is the case if B can potentially be increased by a fraction of period (a week in our case) and
that if the potential duration B is not an integer number of periods, then, we can change bt within a
period such that the benefits in a given period is the fraction of the period that is covered time the
benefit amount b.
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Differentiating the budget constraint of the government, we get that:
(32)
dτ
dbB
=
1
b
· dτ
dB
=
DB
B · (T −D)(εDB ,B + εD,B
D
T −D )
where εDB ,B =
B
DB
dDB
dB is the elasticity of the duration of paid unemployment
with respect to the potential duration of UI benefits and εD,B =
B
D
dD
dB is the
elasticity of the duration of total unemployment with respect to the potential du-
ration of UI benefits. Note of course that because DB =
B−1∑
t=0
S(t), we have that
∂DB
∂B =
B−1∑
t=0
∂S(t)
∂B
+ S(B), which means that the effect of a change in potential
duration on the actual average duration of UI benefits is the sum of the mechan-
ical effect of truncating the distribution of spells at a later point in time S(B)
and a behavioral response. This point is central to the argument in Schmieder,
von Wachter and Bender [2012].
Using (32) and
(33) 1 + ρ2 = (
1
S(B)− s0 − 1)
DB
B · (T −D)(εDB ,B + εD,B
D
T −D )
where ρ2 = −
∂s0
∂aB
∂s0
∂wB
is the liquidity to moral hazard ratio in the effect of an increase
of potential duration. When the lefthand side of 33 is superior to the righthand
side, it is socially desirable to increase the potential duration of benefits, at the
given level of benefit level b.
6. Stochastic wage offers:
The result of proposition 1 can be extended to the presence of stochastic wage
offers, whereby an agent’s hazard rate out of unemployment would depend both
on her search effort and her reservation wage. Suppose that in period t with
probability st (controlled by search intensity) the agent is offered a wage w ∼
wˆ+F (w) and assume i.i.d. wage draws across periods. In such a framework, the
agent follows a reservation-wage policy: in each period, there is a cutoff Rt such
that the agent accepts a job only if the wage w > Rt (McCall [1970]). I show here
that the result of proposition 1 remains unchanged in this context. The intuition
for the result is that the agent is setting her reservation wage profile optimally,
so that the envelope theorem applies and there is no first-order effect of a change
in reservation-wage policy on the agent’s expected utility.
For simplicity we focus on the two-period case. Expected utility at the start of
period 0 is then:
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U = s0P [w ≥ R0]u(ce0) + (1− s0P [w ≥ R0])u(cu0)− ψ(s0)+
β
(
s0P [w ≥ R0]u(ce1) + (1− s0P [w ≥ R0])
(
s1P [w ≥ R1]u(ce1) + (1− s1P [w ≥ R1])u(cu1)− ψ(s1)
))
(34)
where P [w ≥ Rt] is the probability that the wage offered in period t is larger
than the reservation wage in period t.
First-order conditions of the agent’s problem with respect to s0
ψ′(s0) = P [w ≥ R0]u(ce0) + βP [w ≥ R0]u(ce1)− P [w ≥ R0]u(cu0)
− P [w ≥ R0]
(
s1P [w ≥ R1]u(ce1) + (1− s1P [w ≥ R1])u(cu1)− ψ(s1)
)
(35)
First-order conditions of the agent’s problem with respect to R0
0 =
∂P [w ≥ R0]
∂R0
u(ce0) + β
∂P [w ≥ R0]
∂R0
u(ce1)−
∂P [w ≥ R0]
∂R0
u(cu0)
− ∂P [w ≥ R0]
∂R0
(
s1P [w ≥ R1]u(ce1) + (1− s1P [w ≥ R1])u(cu1)− ψ(s1)
)(36)
First-order conditions of the agent’s problem with respect to R1
(37) s1
∂P [w ≥ R1]
∂R1
u(ce1)− s1
∂P [w ≥ R1]
∂R1
u(cu1) = ψ
′(s1)
Euler equations:
u′(ce0) = βu
′(ce1)
u′(cu0) = β(s1P [w ≥ R1]u′(ce1) + (1− s1P [w ≥ R1])u′(cu1))
Using the envelope theorem:
∂s0
∂b0
= −P [w ≥ R0]u
′(cu0)
ψ′′(s0)
And using the Euler equations and the envelope theorem:
∂s0
∂b1
=
∂s0
∂b0
− s1P [w ≥ R1]P [w ≥ R0]u
′(ce0)
ψ′′(s0)
Because ∂s0∂w0 = −
P [w≥R0]u′(ce0)
ψ′′(s0) we have that
∂s0
∂b0
− ∂s0
∂b1
= −h1 ∂s0
∂w0
where h1 = s1P [w ≥ R1] is the hazard rate out of unemployment in period 1,
and P [w ≥ R1] is the probability that the wage offered in period 1 is larger than
the reservation wage in period 1 R1.
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The only difficulty lies in defining the empirical counterparts for the imple-
mentation of the formula, as changes in empirically observed job finding hazards
cannot be directly used to infer the relevant changes in search intensity because
part of the change in job finding hazards comes from changes in the reservation
wage. There are two options for empirical implementation. The first one relies
on the estimation of reservation wage variations to changes in UI benefits and
therefore requires credible data on reservation wages. The idea is that the job
finding hazard ht can be decomposed into its search effort component st and its
reservation-wage policy component P [w ≥ Rt] = 1− F (Rt) where F is the c.d.f.
of the job offer distribution. We have for instance in the two-period case:
d log s0
db0
− d log s0
db1
= [
d log h0
db0
− d log h0
db1
]− f(R0)
1− F (R0) · [
∂R0
∂b0
− ∂R0
∂b1
]
To back out the difference in the effect of benefits at time 0 and at time 1 on search
effort, one needs to estimate the difference in the effect of benefits at time 0 and
at time 1 on the hazard rate (d log h0db0 −
d log h0
db1
) as well as the difference in the effect
of benefits at time 0 and at time 1 on the reservation wage (∂R0∂b0 − ∂R0∂b1 ). There is
unfortunately little empirical evidence on the behaviour of reservation wages. The
best empirical evidence comes from Krueger and Mueller [2014], who, using high
frequency survey data on reservation wage matched with administrative UI data
in New Jersey, show that reservation wage profiles do not respond to UI benefits
(∂R0∂b ≈ 0). The second option consists as in Chetty [2008] in using variations in
mean accepted wages upon reemployment in response to variations in UI benefits.
Again, recent evidence indicates that UI benefit levels have little effect on wages
and other measures of the accepted job’s quality (Ours and Vodopivec [2006]). In
light of the empirical evidence, the empirical implementation of formula 1 using
changes in hazard rates h0 to directly infer changes in search effort s0 seems to
remain a valid approximation in the presence of stochastic wage offers.
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D. State UI Information
Information on state UI laws come from the Significant Provisions of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws, published bi-annually by the US Dept of Labor,
Employment and Training Administration. I consulted state laws and state em-
ployment agencies for more detailed information on benefit schedule variations62.
1. Idaho
In Idaho, the fraction of highest quarter of earnings to compute the weekly
benefit amount is 1/26 for the whole period 1976 to 1984.
Maximum benefit amount
The maximum benefit amount in Idaho in January 1976 is bmax = $90.
It was then increased seven times until December 1983:
$99 for claims filed after 04jul1976
$110 for claims filed after 01jul1977
$116 for claims filed after 01jul1978
$121 for claims filed after 01jul1979
$132 for claims filed after 01jul1980
$145 for claims filed after 01jul1981
$159 for claims filed after 20jun1982.
Minimum benefit amount
The minimum benefit amount in Idaho in January 1976 is bmin = $17.
It was then increased twice until December 1983:
$36 for claims filed after 01jul1980
$45 for claims filed after 01jan1984.
Duration of Benefits
Idaho has a special determination rule for potential duration described in table
B5.
62CWBH has exhaustive information in Georgia on unemployment spells and wage records. But
because of the parameters of the UI system in Georgia, the RK design was inoperable. τ1 = 1/25,
Dmax = 26, τ2 = 1/4 so that Dmax · τ1τ1 > 4 always larger than
bpw
hqw
for all individuals on the left side
of the benefit level kink. I don’t have any observation with only kink in benefit level at the kink.
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Table B5—Determination of Potential Duration 1st tier UI Idaho: 1976-1984
Ratio of bqw/hpw UI Duration
At Least... Less Than... before Jul 1st 1983 after Jul 1st 1983
1.25 1.50 10
1.50 1.750 12 10
1.750 2.00 14 12
2.00 2.250 16 14
2.250 2.500 18 16
2.500 2.750 20 18
2.750 3.000 22 20
3.000 3.250 24 22
3.250 3.500 26 24
3.500 – 26 26
2. Louisiana
In Louisiana, the fraction of highest quarter of earnings to compute the weekly
benefit amount is 1/25 for the whole period 1979 to 1984.
Maximum benefit amount
The maximum benefit amount in Louisiana in January 1979 is bmax = $141.
It was then increased four times until December 1983:
$149 for claims filed after 02sep1979
$164 for claims filed after 07sep1980
$183 for claims filed after 06sep1981
$205 for claims filed after 05sep1982
Minimum benefit amount
The minimum benefit amount in Louisiana from January 1979 until December
1983 is always $10.
Duration of Benefits
The fraction of base period earnings to determine the total amount of benefits
payable for a given benefit year is 2/5. The maximum duration of benefits was
set at 28 weeks. It was reduced to 26 weeks for claims filed after 03apr1983.
3. Missouri
In Missouri, the fraction of highest quarter of earnings to compute the weekly
benefit amount is 1/20 from the beginning of the period covered by the CWBh
data (January 1978) until December 2nd, 1979 when it becomes .045.
Maximum benefit amount
The maximum benefit amount in Missouri in January 1978 is bmax = $85.
It was then increased only once until December 1983:
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$105 for claims filed after02dec1979.
Minimum benefit amount
The minimum benefit amount in Missouri from January 1979 until December
1983 is always $15.
Duration of Benefits
The fraction of base period earnings to determine the total amount of benefits
payable for a given benefit year is 1/3. The maximum duration of benefits is 26
weeks for the whole period covered by the CWBH data.
4. New Mexico
In New Mexico, the fraction of highest quarter of earnings to compute the
weekly benefit amount is 1/26 for the whole period covered by the CWBh data
(January 1980 to December 1983).
Maximum benefit amount
The maximum benefit amount in New Mexico in January 1980 is bmax = $106.
It was then increased three times until December 1983:
$105 for claims filed after02dec1979.
$117 for claims filed after 01jan1981
$130 for claims filed after 01jan1982
$142 for claims filed after 01jan1983
Minimum benefit amount
The minimum benefit amount in New Mexico in January 1980 is $22.
It was then increased to: $24 for claims filed after 01jan1981
$26 for claims filed after 01jan1982
$29 for claims filed after 01jan1983
Duration of Benefits
The fraction of base period earnings to determine the total amount of benefits
payable for a given benefit year is 3/5. The maximum duration of benefits is 26
weeks for the whole period covered by the CWBH data.
5. Washington
In Washington, the weekly benefit amount is computed as a fraction of the av-
erage of the two highest quarters of earnings. The fraction to compute the weekly
benefit amount is 1/25 for the whole period covered by the CWBh data (June
1979 to December 1983).
Maximum benefit amount
The maximum benefit amount in Washington in June 1st, 1979 is bmax = $128.
It was then increased to:
$137 for claims filed after 25jun1979
$150 for claims filed after 06jul1980
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$163 for claims filed after 01jul1981
$178 for claims filed after 01jul1982
$185 for claims filed after 01jul1983
Minimum benefit amount
The minimum benefit amount in in Washington in June 1979 is always $17.
It was then increased to: $41 for claims filed after 06jul1980
$45 for claims filed after 01jul1981
$49 for claims filed after 01jul1982
$51 for claims filed after 01jul1983
Duration of Benefits
The fraction of base period earnings to determine the total amount of benefits
payable for a given benefit year is 1/3. The maximum duration of benefits is 30
weeks for the whole period covered by the CWBH data.
Note that until February 26, 1983, the state of Washington provides for 13 weeks
of State-funded additional benefits for individuals who have exhausted their regu-
lar and Federal-State Extended Benefits63. However, no additional benefit period
was paid while a Federal program was in effect.
63The additional benefits correspond to an ad hoc program which is triggered on only if the Governor
determines it necessary.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 89
6. EB trigger dates
Information on national and state triggers and trigger dates comes from the
weekly trigger notice reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Note that in the
weekly trigger notice reports, there are sometimes some slight adjustments ex-
post because of lags in the computation of the IUR triggers. I therefore rely on
ex post trigger notices where the starting and ending dates of each episodes of
EB are indicated.
National Trigger Dates
Until the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, (effective July 1st 1981),
the EB system had two triggers. A national trigger and state specific triggers.
During the period 1976 to 1981, the national trigger was on three times, from
2/23/1975 to 7/2/1977, from 8/28/1977 to 01/28/1978, and from 7/20/1980 to
1/24/1981, automatically triggering periods of EB in all US states.
Idaho Trigger Dates
During the period 1976 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trig-
ger for Idaho was on four times: from 4/30/1978 to 7/29/1978, from 2/25/79 to
6/6/1979, from 2/17/80 to 7/18/81, and finally from 10/18/81 to the end of the
period covered by the CWBH data.
Louisiana Trigger Dates
During the period 1979 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trigger
for Louisiana was on three times: from 7/20/1980 to 1/24/1981, from 9/12/1981
to 10/23/1982, and finally from 1/23/83 to the end of the period covered by the
CWBH data.
Missouri Trigger Dates
During the period 1978 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trig-
ger for Missouri was on twice: from 6/1/80 to 7/25/1981, and from 3/26/1982 to
6/19/82.
New Mexico Trigger Dates
During the period 1980 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trigger
for New Mexico was on only once from 8/29/82 to 11/27/82
Washington Trigger Dates
During the period 1979 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trigger
for Washington was on without interruption from 7/6/1980 to 7/2/83.
7. Graphical illustration of the kinks in the schedule of UI benefit level and of UI
potential duration
The schedule of UI benefits exhibits kinks for both potential duration and
benefit level. But in some cases these two schedules are related, and therefore the
location of the kinks may also overlap as one can see from the formula for the
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schedule of potential duration
D =
{
Dmax
τ2 · bpwmin(τ1.hqw,bmax) if τ2 ·
bpw
min(τ1·hqw,bmax) ≤ Dmax
To analyze independently the effects of duration and of the benefit amount
in the regression kink design, it is therefore useful to break down the sample in
different subgroups. Figure D1 summarizes the kinked schedules of the weekly
amount and potential duration of UI benefits for Louisiana for all the different
subgroups. First, for claimants who hit the maximum weekly benefit amount,
b = bmax, there is a kink in the relationship between potential duration and base
period earnings bpw at bpw = Dmax.
bmax
τ2
.
D =
{
Dmax
τ2
bmax
· bpw if bpw ≤ Dmax · bmaxτ2
The schedules of b and D for this subgroup is displayed on the left of panel B in
figure D1.
For claimants who are below the maximum weekly benefit amount, b < bmax,
there is a kink in the relationship between potential duration and the ratio of
base period earnings to the highest-earning quarter at bpwhqw = Dmax.
τ1
τ2
.
D =
{
Dmax
τ2
τ1
· bpwhqw if bpwhqw ≤ Dmax · τ1τ2
These claimants are displayed on the right of panel B in figure D1.
Finally, if bpw
min(hqw, bmax
τ1
)
≤ Dmax. τ1τ2 ,
D = τ2 · bpw
min(τ1.hqw, bmax)
, potential duration is always inferior to the maximum duration Dmax but the
relationship between duration and highest quarter earnings hqw exhibits an up-
ward kink at hqw = bmaxτ1 , which is also the point where the relationship between
the weekly benefit amount b and hqw is kinked. The schedule for these claimants
is displayed on the left of panel A in figure D1 When estimating the indepen-
dent effect of b on unemployment duration in the regression kink design, I drop
these observations and focus only on individuals with maximum potential dura-
tion (D = Dmax) to avoid having two endogenous regressors kinked at the same
point.
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Figure D1. UI Benefit Schedule: Weekly Benefit Amount (GREY) & Potential Duration(Black), Louisiana
A. WBA as a kinked function of Highest Quarter Earnings
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B. Potential Duration as a kinked function of Previous Earnings
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Notes: The graph shows the weekly benefit amount (wba: grey dots) and potential duration (potduration: black dots) of Tier I observed
in the CWBH data for Louisiana for 1979 to 1983. Each dot is the average value in the corresponding bin of the assignment variable.
Panel A shows that the weekly benefit amount is a kinked function of the highest quarter of earnings. Panel B shows that potential
duration is a kinked function of the base period earnings for individuals with b = bmax (left) and of the ratio of base period to highest
quarter earnings for individuals with b < bmax (right).
